


UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

FIRST SESSION OF THE  
DOD HISTORICAL RECORDS DECLASSIFICATION  
ADVISORY PANEL

Friday, February 23, 1996  
0900-1400 hours  
National Archives Building  
Reception Room 105




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Executive Order 12958, Classified National Security Information, requires automatic declassification of non-exempt historical files over 25 years old. The Department of Defense (DoD) Historical Records Declassification Advisory Panel (HRDAP) is established under the Federal Advisory Committee Act as a subcommittee to the Historical Advisory Panel. The HRDAP charter is to recommend information and topic areas that would be valuable to historians and the public. DoD will consider those recommendations for immediate declassification. The HRDAP is chaired by Dr. Alfred Goldberg, OSD Historian; Ms. Rene Davis-Harding, Deputy Director, Security Program Integration, serves as Executive Secretary. Six civilian historians and historians from the military services and JCS comprise the panel. The Panel will meet four times per year. The transcripts for the February 23, 1996 meeting were prepared by a contract transcription service.



COMMAND, CONTROL,  
COMMUNICATIONS, AND  
INTELLIGENCE

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
6000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-6000

18 MAR 1996



MEMORANDUM FOR DEFENSE TECHNICAL INFORMATION CENTER

SUBJECT: Panel Minutes

Reference telephone conversation between the undersigned and  
Gretchen Schlag, DTIC Selections Branch.

Two copies of verbatim transcripts are forwarded for  
inclusion in the DTIC holdings. The transcripts are from the DoD  
Historical Records Declassification Advisory Panel. This Panel  
was established by the Secretary of Defense under the Federal  
Advisory Committee Act (FACA). FACA requires open hearings  
announced in the Federal Register and that meeting minutes be  
made available for public inspection.

The transcripts are unclassified with unrestricted  
dissemination. SF Form 298 is attached. For additional  
information, please contact me at (703) 695-2289.

*Cynthia M. Kloss*  
Cynthia M. Kloss  
Assistant Director  
Classification Management



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P R O C E E D I N G S

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0900

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DR. GOLDBERG: I'll hold my opening remarks until after our welcoming speaker arrives, in about 15 minutes. Meanwhile, I think we will start with administrative announcements and by way of one preliminary remark, I'm hoping that this forum will be one of good temper, good humor, good ideas. Ms. Davis -- administrative notes?

11

MS. DAVIS-HARDING: No, I'll do those.

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DR. GOLDBERG: Ms. Davis-Harding.

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MS. DAVIS-HARDING: My name is Rene Davis-Harding. I'm the Executive Secretary for the panel. I'd like to go -- briefly go over some administrative announcements. All proceedings are going to be recorded, and if you would prefer to be identified by name in the minutes, please state your name clearly before you make your remark, otherwise, you'll be identified as an observer in the minutes.

21

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25

Each panel member has a complete -- or should have a complete package of information. We sent out several packages of handouts, and each member should have a complete notebook. If you do not, please get in touch with me or Cynthia Kloss on my staff, who will

1 make sure that you get a complete package.

2 Information from members or observers that  
3 you would like to have considered for inclusion, will  
4 be considered by the chair for inclusion in the minutes  
5 or inclusion for being sent out to the members.

6 Due to limited resources, we unfortunately  
7 cannot provide handouts to everyone, but we will  
8 attempt to do so. Any submissions for future  
9 committee meetings should be provided to Cynthia Kloss  
10 from my staff, at least one week prior to the meeting,  
11 to make sure that we're able to have those submissions  
12 in the meeting packets.

13 On meeting transcripts -- the verbatim  
14 transcripts will be available only on request, and an  
15 executive summary will be provided to all panel  
16 members, including the military services and the other  
17 observers -- government observers. And any attendees  
18 may request a copy of the executive summary through e-  
19 mail and the e-mail address is on the bottom of the  
20 agenda for today.

21 On refreshments, breaks and other items.  
22 Coffee is provided in the rear of the room for  
23 everyone, and we ask that you please refrain from  
24 moving around during the formal panel deliberations.  
25 Breaks will be strictly at the discretion of the chair

1 and restrooms for men and ladies --

2 DR. GOLDBERG: You will be permitted to leave  
3 for that purpose. You'll have to raise your hands of  
4 course.

5 MS. DAVIS-HARDING: The mens' room is at the  
6 left, all the way at the end of the hall; and the  
7 ladies' room is to your right as you exit, all the way  
8 at the end of the hallway.

9 We expect lunch to arrive at approximately  
10 11:30 to 11:45, and we're very flexible with the lunch  
11 break. It may not extend to 60 minutes -- that's going  
12 to be up to the chair.

13 Telephones are available in the basement of  
14 the building. You may use the elevator, and during  
15 break, the room phone will be available for outside  
16 local calls. We unfortunately, do not have the ability  
17 to take phone messages while you're here.

18 And finally, name tags are being provided as  
19 a courtesy to the other participants and as a way to  
20 identify everyone. That's it.

21 DR. GOLDBERG: We are here because we believe  
22 that the government has a special obligation to keep  
23 the public informed. It does this by publishing  
24 documents, histories, and by giving the citizens access  
25 to its records. Indeed, one doesn't even have to be a

1 citizen to have access to U.S. government records.

2 The enormous growth in government classified  
3 documents during the past six decades has confronted us  
4 with the complex problem of how to make accessible to  
5 the public a maximum number of those records with a  
6 minimum of security risk.

7 Ever since World War II a series of Executive  
8 Orders have sought to deal with this problem with  
9 limited success. The classifiers seem to be able to  
10 keep ahead of the declassifiers in some departments.

11 Let me recapitulate where we are coming from.  
12 The 1995 Executive Order 12958 provides for automatic  
13 declassification of historically valuable records after  
14 25 years. But there is a catch in that. It also lists  
15 nine areas for exemption from automatic  
16 declassification and provides for systematic  
17 declassification of historically valuable exempted  
18 records.

19 The Executive Order establishes an  
20 information security oversight office within the  
21 management -- the Office of Management and Budget -- to  
22 see to the implementation of the Order. This of course  
23 is the same office that has been in existence for many  
24 years under other agencies. I believe it is going to  
25 move into the National Archives building in the near

1 future.

2 It also establishes -- that is the Executive  
3 Order establishes an interagency security appeals panel  
4 composed of senior level officials to decide on appeals  
5 from declassification challenges and appeals for review  
6 of mandatory classification, and to approve, deny or  
7 amend agency exemptions from automatic  
8 declassification.

9 There's also an information security policy  
10 advisory council of seven members, not employees of the  
11 government. Its function are to advise the President  
12 on policies, recommend changes in policies, recommend  
13 to agency heads in the specific subject areas  
14 systematic declassification review, to serve as a forum  
15 to discuss policy issues and disputes. The Director  
16 will provide support to the council.

17 Unfortunately these two bodies are not yet  
18 operating. The members of the council have not yet  
19 been appointed, therefore they can't get anywhere. The  
20 other body, to my knowledge, has not yet met.

21 But nevertheless, our panel is part of a  
22 larger government-wide apparatus to which DOD is  
23 responsible. We're an important part, because DOD has  
24 such a large percentage of government record holdings.  
25 The last time I was aware of the amount, I think it was

1 something like 27-30 percent of the records in the  
2 National Archives by Department of Defense records.

3 In response to the Executive Order, the  
4 Department of Defense issued its overall  
5 declassification plan in October. The military  
6 services select staff at defense agencies which hold  
7 most of the records of the Department of Defense have  
8 or will issue individual declassification plans. I  
9 think some of you may have seen them already.

10 The Secretary of Defense has given  
11 responsibility for overseeing DOD declassification to  
12 the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command,  
13 Control, Communications and Intelligence, known  
14 familiarly as C3I. Last winter C3I gave consideration  
15 to establishment of a departmental declassification  
16 advisory panel, that would include scholars from  
17 outside the Department of Defense. The reaction in OSD  
18 was favorable.

19 A further impetus to action came from the  
20 letter in July to the Assistant Secretary of Defense  
21 C3I from a group of scholars, including some of you,  
22 suggesting the creation of the liaison committee to  
23 advise on desirable priorities for the selection of the  
24 Defense Department's records for review and  
25 declassification of the new Executive Order.

1           The Assistant Secretary received through  
2       Emmet Page, responded with a strong affirmative and  
3       arrangements began to establish the panel that would  
4       carry out the function.

5           For ease of administration, always a prime  
6       consideration in a large bureaucracy -- DOD is a large  
7       one -- the committee was established as a panel of the  
8       Defense Historical Advisory Committee, with C3I  
9       providing the administrative apparatus, for which I am  
10      profoundly grateful.

11          The charter of the Defense Historical  
12      Advisory Committee has been amended to include the  
13      Defense Historical Records Advisory Panel. The  
14      planning session attended by many of you was held on  
15      November the 30th last. It helped clarify some of the  
16      problems and issues involved in the establishment and  
17      operation of the proposed panel.

18          This brings us to date. This is a panel  
19      established by the Department of Defense to help  
20      facilitate, we hope, the declassification of DOD  
21      records. It has two constituent elements: Chiefs of  
22      DOD historical offices and scholars from the academic  
23      community. These two represent the two most prolific  
24      groups researching defense records.

25          The Departmental leadership beliefs that

1 informed outside scholars acquainted with government  
2 records, and the declassification process, provide a  
3 public presence on the panel and can lend expert  
4 assistance to the panel's work. The Chiefs of the DOD  
5 historical offices and their staffs have authoritative  
6 knowledge about many groups of the records.

7 We're fortunate to have available to us also  
8 the expert advice of DOD's record managers and  
9 archivists of the National Archives and Record  
10 Administration. Moreover, we hope to draw on the  
11 specialized knowledge of other scholars who are  
12 familiar with the bodies of DOD records.

13 The DOD declassification plan issued by C3I  
14 calls for declassifying 15 percent of the effective  
15 records each year for five years. Estimates of DOD  
16 records involved are 500,000,000-plus pages. We  
17 emphasize the plus. The Navy and Marine Corps report  
18 about 500,000,000 pages on their own, so it's quite  
19 possible that we're talking about more than a billion  
20 pages of records to look at during the next five years  
21 and the number will undoubtedly grow.

22 Fifteen percent of 500,000,000 would be about  
23 75,000,000 pages per year, and there may be release of  
24 documents by internet or other electronic means.

25 It seems likely that most of the records will

1 be subject to systematic review rather than automatic  
2 declassification, because priority during the first  
3 year will probably be on the low sensitivity category  
4 documents, that is documents with a little classified  
5 information. The panel probably opted those efforts to  
6 the records of high and medium sensitivity, that is,  
7 more highly classified records.

8 Let me remind you that in addition to the  
9 normal systematic declassification process, which has  
10 been functioning, there are declassification programs  
11 in particular areas of high public and political  
12 interest. These include the human radiation  
13 experiments program, a huge effort across the  
14 government in which DOD played a major part; the POW-  
15 MIA records; the Gulf War syndrome records, a three or  
16 four year effort by the Army; and the Kennedy  
17 assassination records -- and there are a lot of related  
18 DOD documents.

19 Let me bring to your attention the existence  
20 also of the Commission on Protecting and Reducing  
21 government secrecy, established by Public Law 103236 on  
22 April 30, 1994 in the Foreign Relations Authorization  
23 Act for fiscal years 94 and 95. This 12-member  
24 commission includes members from Congress, the  
25 executive branch and the public.

1           The Commission's function is to investigate  
2 all matters in any way related to any legislation,  
3 executive order, regulation, practice or procedure  
4 relating to classified information, for granting  
5 security clearances, and to submit to Congress a final  
6 report containing recommendations on the classification  
7 of national security information and the granting of  
8 security clearances. It had broad powers, including  
9 subpoena power, a staff, and funds.

10           It is to make a final report two years after  
11 the date of the first meeting, which I understand was  
12 earlier this year, so we may not get the report in  
13 1997. To the extent that it can help reduce the volume  
14 of classified materials in the future, it will ease the  
15 task of declassification.

16           I think that you are aware of some other road  
17 blocks that obstruct the declassification process. The  
18 problem of foreign government NATO documents will  
19 continue to limit access to bodies of records. Getting  
20 permission from all the other members of NATO to  
21 release documents is a lengthy and wearing process.  
22 Access to intelligence records, especially secret and  
23 crypto-materials will continue to be difficult, and of  
24 course there are the statutory bands on disclosure or  
25 release -- certain prisoner of war information, for

1 instance.

2 The responsibility for providing  
3 declassification guidance to the various elements of  
4 defense belongs to the DOD declassification management  
5 panel composed of representatives of the major elements  
6 of the department. The two panels, this panel and the  
7 declassification management panel, are complementary  
8 and should maintain a cooperative relationship. To my  
9 knowledge, that panel has not yet met.

10 The prime purpose of this panel is to  
11 determine declassification of bodies of DOD records  
12 that would best serve the interest of the public and  
13 the scholarly community, and I assume that the two  
14 interests are essentially the same. Since the capacity  
15 for declassification is limited, we will find it  
16 necessary to try to establish some order of priority  
17 for declassification.

18 As an advisory panel, we will have to present  
19 our findings in the form of recommendations to the  
20 Assistant Secretary C3I and the Assistant Secretary of  
21 Defense. In the final analysis, each element of the  
22 Department engaged in declassification will determine  
23 its own priorities. I'm hopeful that with support of  
24 officials from the office of the Secretary of Defense,  
25 I believe that they intend to be supportive, our

1 recommendations will carry enough weight to influence  
2 priorities. I have no doubt that this panel can make  
3 some difference.

4 We're all aware of the frustration  
5 experienced by many of us in securing access to  
6 classified records and in securing declassification  
7 records. I have no doubt that we could spend a great  
8 deal of time venting our frustrations and prescribing  
9 procedures for speedier or large scale  
10 declassification. Instead of that, I hope -- I ask  
11 that we adhere to our prescribed function of  
12 recommending declassification priorities for which we  
13 can offer the strongest support. We will be able to  
14 make discernable progress if we stick to our task.

15 As you're all aware, virtually all of the  
16 documents with which this panel will be concerned are  
17 in the National Archives at its Federal Records Center  
18 here at Suitland and elsewhere around the country.  
19 We're therefore going to have to do a considerable  
20 amount of business with the National Archives and  
21 Records Administration. We are fortunate to have a  
22 liaison at the Archives for this purpose, Michael Hertz  
23 and Jeanne Schauble. Ms. Schauble is present and  
24 prepared to represent NARA in our discussions.

25 I'd like at this time to pause and to welcome

1 our welcoming speaker this morning, Mr. Frank Horton.  
2 I'm informed that Dr. Horton does not insist on having  
3 long biographical details of his career before --  
4 before presenting himself, so I would like to welcome  
5 Mr. Horton who is representing the Assistant Secretary,  
6 Mr. Page. He's not here yet. Beg pardon?

7 MS. DAVIS-HARDING: He's somewhere in the  
8 traffic.

9 DR. GOLDBERG: I thought I saw him. We will  
10 dispense with that for the time being and move on. I  
11 am interested in hearing from the members of the panel  
12 here, as I say, I am hopeful that they brought good  
13 ideas. Our goals, as I have indicated, are to, if  
14 possible, expand the scope of the records to be  
15 declassified, speed up the process if possible, and  
16 provide some guidance to the declassifiers by  
17 establishing priorities for the kinds of records we  
18 would like to see declassified.

19 We're tasked to recommend priorities for  
20 declassification, and in recommending priorities we are  
21 also in effect bringing about an expansion of the scope  
22 of declassification. Speeding up the process will, of  
23 course, depend on the resources made available to the  
24 job and this is a theme to which we will undoubtedly  
25 return again and again during the course of this

1 meeting and future meetings, because whatever is going  
2 to be done depend on the resources devoted to doing the  
3 job.

4 Looking at it from a historical viewpoint,  
5 we're all aware that many government programs, whether  
6 enjoined by Executive Order or statute often lag behind  
7 established target dates. This declassification is  
8 especially vulnerable to resource allocation because it  
9 is projected on such an enormous level -- such a high  
10 level. It would take a lot of money and people to  
11 carry it out. As I say, we'll probably be coming back  
12 to this a number of times during the course of the  
13 meeting. We can't overlook it; we have to be aware of  
14 it and have to be aware that we can recommend, we can  
15 propose that somebody else is going to dispose of these  
16 recommendations.

17 With that I would like to open the meeting to  
18 suggestions, comments, from the panel. Mr. Wampler.

19 DR. WAMPLER: Yes, -- on the agenda for  
20 discussion which is in the blue package we received --  
21 just this last one that puts something up and duly  
22 shoot it down, because a sense of how the people within  
23 the agencies would like to see the panel interact with  
24 them. And what I'm going to put on the record for  
25 people to look at was a model which inspired some of us

1 in proposing this panel in the first place, which was a  
2 similar liaison organization that was set up for the  
3 Department of Energy which worked upon a process which  
4 presented information to the outside scholars about the  
5 existing retired record groups. Those were the  
6 discrete units you were working with. We need to try  
7 to establish some way to put triage on this -- what are  
8 the most important, the most interesting of those  
9 record groups to scholars that they would like to see  
10 us assign a high priority?

11 That to me, seems to make sense in this  
12 setting, rather than some sort of effort to devise a  
13 list of subject priorities which would lead for a  
14 search for documents amongst the hundreds of different  
15 retired record groups amongst all the different  
16 services and all the different offices and agencies  
17 that we're dealing with here.

18 So it seems that one way to approach this  
19 might be a two step process whereby first of all you do  
20 try to establish what are your high interest priority  
21 subject areas. That in turn can serve as the  
22 guidelines by which you then approach the issue of  
23 trying to sort through all the various retired records  
24 that the different services and offices are trying to  
25 deal with here, because that, I assume, is the method

1 in which they're approaching this. You've got to  
2 return record accessions for the various services and  
3 for DOD. You pull over boxes of those. You don't pull  
4 over cervical cuts or files within boxes spread out  
5 amongst many different accessions.

6 So we have to find some way to mesh the  
7 subject interest of the outside community, the  
8 scholars, the public, with the units within which the  
9 different offices are dealing and try to come up the  
10 ultimate mix of those. Dr. Goldberg said most of this  
11 is probably going to be addressed towards records which  
12 will probably fall in category 1 or category 2, which  
13 present the most promise for you in screening these and  
14 also in trying to meet whatever work plan targets that  
15 you set down for yourselves.

16 I made the argument the last time and this  
17 time that it seems to me that it doesn't make a great  
18 deal of sense to try to backload the process with the  
19 most difficult materials, thereby assuring that you're  
20 going to not comply, but at least try to establish a  
21 learning curve in applying the new guidelines to the  
22 category 1 and 2 materials from the start, in some way.

23 And also it just seems to make sense from a  
24 public relations point of view to try to get some of  
25 the high interest items out there throughout the entire

1 process, and not have them all be waiting towards the  
2 end.

3 I provided my own selective list of some of  
4 the document collections that I know exist at the  
5 National Records Center for record group 330, which has  
6 some of the very high-level, high-policy document  
7 collections of the Office of the Secretary of Defense  
8 or the Office of the Assistant Secretary for National  
9 Security Affairs, or the Assistant Secretary for Atomic  
10 Energy Affairs for late 50's into the 60's, all of  
11 which I would assume fall under the purview of the  
12 Executive Order. It would be rather replete with  
13 documents of great interest to us. It would also be  
14 rather replete with category 1 and category 2  
15 documents, and this, I think, is what we'll probably be  
16 trying to come to an agreement on. How do we deal with  
17 these -- the very records that are most interesting,  
18 the ones that present the most difficulties.

19 That was my idea as far as one way to deal  
20 with this. Dr. Goldberg has already mentioned another  
21 point which I made, which is the need to have a very  
22 close coordination with NARA. I mean if these things  
23 get reviewed, declassified, NARA has to be ready to  
24 take the hand off because then there's a very large  
25 logistical problem on their end. They have to

1       repackage these, get pull sheets put in them, get them  
2       ready, and you want to, to the degree possible, to have  
3       the least amount of delay from the time DOD or the  
4       services are ready to hand off the records, and NARA is  
5       ready then to make them available to the public,  
6       therefore carrying out the final intent of the  
7       Executive Order.

8               That in gist, is what I put down in my much  
9       longer submission, and I'm just curious to see how the  
10      people who are on the other side, having to deal with  
11      this, feel about that sort of approach, adding input to  
12      their decision-making process.

13             DR. GOLDBERG: I'm interesting in hearing  
14      from representatives of the services or others in this  
15      matter. Yes.

16             MR. DAVIS: Jim Davis from Aerospace museum.  
17      I agree to the approach that you've suggested, and that  
18      is to identify key offices and advisory groups and  
19      organizations within DOD for 47-aught (ph) -- and  
20      regardless of where the records are, simply devote the  
21      authority of the declassification effort to those  
22      particular records. So for example, within RG-330, the  
23      Secretary of Defense, deputy or under secretary of  
24      Defense, Assistant Secretary of Defense, and Atomic  
25      Energy Secretary of Defense for International Security

1       Affairs and probably Defense Director of Research and  
2       Engineering -- and then along with that, the various RG  
3       advisory bodies starting with the research and  
4       development. And then moving over to different DOD  
5       components, for example, Secretary of the Air Force,  
6       Secretary of the Air Force, a couple of key assistant  
7       secretaries of the Air Force, and perhaps scientific  
8       advisory bodies and so on and so forth. You simply do  
9       that in chronological order.

10               DR. GOLDBERG: You didn't mention the C3I.  
11       Speaking of C3I, our speaker has arrived, and I'd like  
12       to introduce to you Dr. Frank Horton, principal deputy,  
13       Assistant Secretary of C3I. I'll skip the biographical  
14       details.

15               DR. HORTON: Thank you, sir. Dr. Goldberg,  
16       members of the Board, many of whom I've known in other  
17       capacities these past years, distinguished guests,  
18       ladies and gentlemen. Thank you for attending the  
19       first formal session of the Historical Records  
20       Declassification Advisory Panel meeting. Pleased to be  
21       able to join you on behalf of Assistant Secretary Page,  
22       who is out of town, unfortunately, or else he would  
23       have been here, and Secretary Perry.

24               This is indeed a time of change for those of  
25       us who work in National Security. Balancing the

1 challenges of the next century with fewer resources  
2 forces us in the Department of Defense, to reevaluate  
3 how we conduct our business. A vital aspect of that  
4 business is protecting our nation's secrets and with  
5 respect to this panel, balancing that with supporting  
6 the public's right to know.

7 Today's forum is one step towards security  
8 (inaudible) this important endeavor. You're here today  
9 because of new guidance issued by President Clinton.  
10 Executive Order 12958 on Classified National Security  
11 Information, directs us to establish a comprehensive  
12 declassification program. The Order states, and I  
13 quote, "Within five years from the date of this Order,  
14 all classified information contained in records (1)  
15 more than 25 years old and (2) have been determined to  
16 have permanent historical value, shall be automatically  
17 declassified, whether or not the records have been  
18 reviewed."

19 This is our motivation, and in his September  
20 5, 1995 memorandum, the Secretary of Defense, Dr.  
21 Perry, established this distinguished advisory panel.  
22 Our charter is to develop a listing of comparable  
23 areas, that from a historical and public perspective,  
24 the Department will consider for declassification  
25 immediately. The Department of Defense

1       declassification plan also emphasizes the role of this  
2       panel. Make no mistake, the Secretary of Defense is  
3       committed to making the declassification program a  
4       reality.

5               Approximately 18 months ago, I spoke to the  
6       National Classification Management Society during their  
7       annual training seminar. Part of my speech was to  
8       challenge the security community to work from a states-  
9       bound in the previous classification management system.  
10       For instance, 1982, a system was established to let  
11       original classifiers do what he or she had to do to  
12       protect information security at all costs. Something  
13       went wrong with that system.

14              The declassification provisions for the then  
15       Executive Order never did work as intended.  
16       Information did not complete a natural evolution cycle  
17       of classification, implementation, declassification,  
18       and release to the public.

19              Clearer, distinctive guidance directed at  
20       those individuals who classify information to identify  
21       the date or event that would serve as the  
22       declassification benchmark. I have yet to see and I'm  
23       sure you have yet to see a document labeled "declassify  
24       on cessation of the Cold War."

25              OADR or Originating Agency Determination

1 Required was designated to be the exception to the  
2 declassification rule. In retrospect, OADR became the  
3 norm or the rule. It appeared that everything was  
4 being classified indefinitely.

5 Compare that environment with today's.  
6 Declassification is a reality. We no longer authorize  
7 the use of OADR, eliminating what some would say is the  
8 easy way out. Classifiers are held accountable for the  
9 full life cycle of the information they generate.  
10 Cradle to grave decisions on classification and  
11 safeguards will be a part of the solution for future  
12 generations involved with National Security and  
13 historical research.

14 However, today's reality is that there is a  
15 monumental vacuum that must be filled in the area of  
16 declassification. Many of you on the panel have  
17 already found the time to review the Department of  
18 Defense's declassification plans. With approximately  
19 700,000,000 pages of documents, potentially  
20 declassifiable, we do not lack for work. You're  
21 exploring technological solutions to assist  
22 declassification programs, but in the end, it will be  
23 people using their best judgement that will make the  
24 difference on how we view information protection.

25 On behalf of Secretaries Page and Perry, I

1 challenge this panel to collectively identify those  
2 areas that will produce the largest return for the time  
3 and resources invested. The Department of Defense will  
4 declassify materials, but the speed and focus of their  
5 efforts are open to your recommendations.

6 Finally, some acknowledgements. When  
7 Professor Trachtenberg first approached Assistant  
8 Secretary Page, my boss, with his offer to establish a  
9 liaison committee between Defense and academia, we  
10 found a perfect combination of factors to help us turn  
11 the tide on the declassification planning process.

12 I wish to extend my sincere appreciation and  
13 those above me, to Dr. Trachtenberg for his initiative  
14 and those of the remaining scholars on the panel. I  
15 would also wish on my own and their behalf, to thank  
16 Dr. Goldberg, the Secretary of Defense Historian for  
17 agreeing to chair this panel. Dr. Goldberg has been  
18 instrumental in assisting us with the many details  
19 required in establishing the panel.

20 My staff stands ready to assist all of you in  
21 any way possible, to gather the information needed to  
22 achieve our mutual objective. In addition to the work  
23 of this panel, I am aware that many of you serve on  
24 advisory committees for other government agencies.  
25 This synergism of activity indicates to me just how

1 aggressive the government is in achieving our  
2 collective goal of openness.

3 Some of these recommendations may be  
4 difficult to accomplish because of legitimate national  
5 security concerns, however, I assure you that all of  
6 your recommendations will receive full consideration by  
7 the Senior leadership of the Department. Good luck  
8 today in your formal session. Thank you, sir.

9 DR. GOLDBERG: Thank you. We've had some  
10 interesting proposals presented by Misters Wampler and  
11 Davis, which I think are moving in the right direction.  
12 The question that remains, of course, is how fast can  
13 we move in that direction given the usual problems of  
14 declassifying, of priorities, et cetera. We must bear  
15 in mind that the services and other entities in the  
16 Department also have their priorities, and in effect,  
17 we are going to be competing with them. If they have  
18 dedicated themselves to declassifying 15 percent of  
19 hundreds of millions of pages of documents, and they  
20 genuinely intend to do so, then I think it likely that  
21 they are going to start with those that will be easiest  
22 to declassify and permit them to reach their goals.

23 So what I am suggesting is that we can go  
24 ahead and make these recommendations, but we probably  
25 should not expect that they will be carried out

1 expeditiously. It may take time, it probably will take  
2 time to do the sort of thing we want done because  
3 declassifying highly classified records can take much  
4 longer than declassifying the lower level records. I  
5 think it's practical considerations of this kind -- and  
6 we're dealing with a very pragmatic situation here --  
7 not only a matter of money and resources, it's a matter  
8 of a lot of different entities within Defense -- OSD,  
9 the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the four services, three  
10 departments, 15 agencies -- all of which have their own  
11 programs, their own priorities and varying resources  
12 and goals.

13 So we're operating within something of a maze  
14 and the problem is going to be, as far as possible, to  
15 make our way out of that and get some people in  
16 authority to make decisions. I think we will get that,  
17 but I don't expect it to be done overnight, and I hope  
18 that you won't either. Yes, Mr. Leffler.

19 PROF. LEFFLER: My observation is that there  
20 is a great deal of emphasis on -- on openness, but the  
21 initial effort, as I see it in almost all the agencies,  
22 has been to specify all the records that were exempt  
23 from order of declassification, and I'm sure that this  
24 is an understandable first move.

25 But I would put on the table and follow up on

1 (inaudible) by saying it would be desirable if we could  
2 agree to ask for services to identify perhaps for our  
3 next meeting three months from now, the top ten  
4 priorities that they would suggest to us for  
5 declassification amongst the categories enumerated for  
6 systematic declassification. That would sort of move  
7 us forward to sort of getting into an actual give and  
8 take about what -- what's to be the priorities -- those  
9 records that we all submit to be of greatest value.

10 DR. GOLDBERG: I think that can be done. We  
11 have every right to ask for information, and I trust  
12 that we will get it. Colonel Ponnwitz?

13 COL. PONNWITZ: I'd like to make one comment  
14 on Professor Wampler's memo of 19 February. In your  
15 second paragraph you asked about FOIA's information.  
16 Now, our service is personnel oriented, so the charge  
17 of our FOIA requests are for verification of medical  
18 claims that go before the VA and legal issues against -  
19 - individual services. So in this light, you wouldn't  
20 get the kind of information out of that that you might  
21 expect.

22 However, there is on matters that don't apply  
23 to those two categories, this may be another approach  
24 that we could certainly look at.

25 DR. WAMPLER: Well, it was just an effort to

1 try to find at least a paper trail that is the first  
2 cut at public interest, and also a first cut in which  
3 returned records have been pulled most often in  
4 response to those requests as a way of getting to set  
5 some of these priorities. The sense I get after  
6 looking at the work plans -- that these are sort of  
7 like (inaudible) plans -- talk about requirements, and  
8 we're coming at this from two different approaches.  
9 And how we mesh these two is going to part of what we  
10 may butt heads on.

11 Now, what I would like to get down to, as Mel  
12 said, is particulars, to get a sense of how the people  
13 who are dealing with this -- what use do they see for  
14 this panel? Are we just muddying the waters for them?  
15 Are we actually helping them in any way? How can our  
16 advice be structured to be of most use to them? I  
17 mean, we're trying to mesh some ongoing traffic here,  
18 and give some direction to it. Well how do we do that?

19 And I know he doesn't want to jump into this,  
20 he's got documents that I want from him, he might get  
21 back at me eventually, but Brian -- do our things on  
22 Record Group 330, I mean, do the ideas I'm putting  
23 forth in any way make sense for what you're trying to  
24 do in terms of your review, or do we just create  
25 headaches for you if we try to do this?

1 DR. GOLDBERG: That's an appropriate  
2 question.

3 MR. KINNEY: (inaudible) if you come up  
4 with -- makes sense to me, anyhow -- interested in --

5 DR. GOLDBERG: It seems to me that following  
6 up your remarks, Al, that these plans which have been  
7 submitted really give you a handle to start with. They  
8 list records that they want to exempt and these  
9 presumably -- not presumably -- it seems to me are the  
10 kind that you are very much interested in, and they  
11 actually give you then listings of the kinds of things  
12 you might want to ask for, and give priority to. Did  
13 that occur to you?

14 PROF. LEFFLER: Well, it occurs to me --  
15 that's what we got into discussion about, right now  
16 it's simply an enumerated list of those documents that  
17 are going to be automatically declassified. Sure, I  
18 mean, but most of these of subject oriented categories,  
19 which would create impossible barriers for orderly  
20 declassification. You need, as Bob Wampler said, you  
21 need to do it by accession groups in order to make it  
22 reasonable. So you need to identify the accession  
23 groups. I think Bob has put it in a very reasonable  
24 way, within the category of the OCG-230 -- that  
25 perhaps we can agree on certain categories of that

1 sort, depending on Air Force and Army et cetera as  
2 well.

3 DR. GOLDBERG: You mean specific accessions  
4 within the record groups?

5 PROF. LEFFLER: Yes.

6 DR. GOLDBERG: Not the record groups as such?

7 PROF. LEFFLER: Right.

8 MR. DAVIS: What -- as it stands now -- are  
9 the parameters in category 3 of the various DOD  
10 components? And what sort of effort required to review  
11 those to see if they would be automatically  
12 declassified? The reason I ask this question is for  
13 example, if category 3 records of the Department of the  
14 Navy include let's say, bureau of medicine and surgery  
15 records in RG-52, it would seem to me that it would be  
16 more constructive to spend or to devote the reviewer's  
17 time to let's say, reviewing C&O records or ECNO  
18 records or something along those lines.

19 This of course, lowers the potential numbers  
20 of records that would be automatically declassified,  
21 but as I understand it, there's such limited resources  
22 in the declassification area, I think (inaudible).

23 PROF. TRACHTENBERG: I'd like to make some  
24 comments about the general problem. The first point is  
25 that I don't think the historians on the panel should

1 be viewed as simply the advocates of opening up as much  
2 sensitive material as possible. I think our  
3 fundamental approach is adversarial in that sense. We  
4 all have a common problem here -- that's the problem of  
5 striking a balance. What's the balance between the  
6 need to have a rational declassification system --  
7 because the present system, I believe everybody agrees  
8 doesn't serve anybody's interest -- and the need which  
9 I think, historians by and large recognize, to make  
10 sure that certain kinds of material are innocuous.

11 What can we do? We could offer advice, but  
12 in order for that advice to be effective, it has to be  
13 targeted on real issues. It's up to the agencies to  
14 come to us in a more specific way and say, where should  
15 we allocate our priorities? Here's the list of  
16 different possibilities. Here are the different  
17 series. This is what's inside such and such a series.  
18 Where do you think the emphasis should be placed? This  
19 is -- this is -- this means that we have to move  
20 eventually to getting a list of holdings that are being  
21 -- you know, they're excepted from automatic  
22 declassification -- but they're being  
23 declassification -- so that we can have some meaningful  
24 input.

25 Until that's done, what can we do? What

1     should we talk about today? Well, there are certain  
2     principles of a general nature that we could, I think,  
3     agree upon, that should possibly guide the -- the  
4     people who are actually doing the declassification work  
5     in their efforts. And the principle that occurred to  
6     me -- and I think most of the academic historians would  
7     agree with this -- is that there is a basic cluster of  
8     issues that we are very interested in, and which we do  
9     not believe would seriously, or in any significant way,  
10    compromise legitimate national security interests.

11                   What are these issues? Not things like  
12    weapon design or any kinds of nuts and bolts things --  
13    you know, details of intelligence gathering or anything  
14    like that. We're interested at the top of the policy  
15    process. High policy. High strategy. Fundamental  
16    issues that bear on the core of the story. Issues of  
17    medicine; issues of what are you going to do if you  
18    have a particular problem like -- you know, Soviets'  
19    cutting off access to Berlin to take a particular case  
20    that a lot of us are interested in? How does this  
21    relate to fundamental strategy for the defense of  
22    Europe? How much independent authority do military  
23    commanders have? What can we say about the strategy  
24    making process? To what extent do parochial service  
25    interest bear on the final decisions that are made?

1 Issues relating to the control of nuclear weapons, to  
2 the sharing nuclear weapons with allies.

3 All those kinds of issues of a conceptual  
4 nature. There's no reason to keep those things a  
5 secret. And that's where the efforts should be  
6 targeted, in my view. Not -- not all these kinds of  
7 technical things which do not bear on questions of hard  
8 policy.

9 How does this relate to the whole question of  
10 how should the declassifiers allocate their efforts?  
11 There's a fundamental tension, it seems to me, between  
12 the requirements of the Executive Order and what the  
13 historians are interested in. The Executive Order says  
14 you've got to declassify X percent of documents by such  
15 and such a date -- and that means that there's an  
16 incentive for the declassifier as to concentrate on the  
17 documents that are of least interest, frankly. The  
18 things that are least sensitive and nobody cares  
19 about -- this is the stuff that they're going to be  
20 releasing first.

21 To my surprise and delight, a number of the  
22 agencies said that they were going to concentrate on  
23 the most sensitive stuff -- not that this is going to  
24 be released first, but that this is where their efforts  
25 were going to be allocated.

1                   Now, we all know that's bureaucratic process  
2     to a certain degree and the requirements of the  
3     Executive Order have to be respected, but in terms of  
4     the internal allocation of efforts within the agencies,  
5     it would make sense, I think, to say that a certain  
6     percentage of time, a certain percentage of that  
7     effort, should be devoted to the areas of greatest  
8     interest, not the sorts of things that are going to  
9     compromise, you know, the legitimate national security  
10    interests, but the sorts of things that historians in  
11    the public as a whole, I believe, would be interested  
12    in, and will give us insight into what was going on in  
13    that period.

14                  One final point. It was mentioned that we  
15    have to worry about foreign governments about the NATO  
16    documents and so on. When we think about the whole  
17    issue, how can historians help, just here in an  
18    advisory capacity? We can only do what people ask us  
19    to do.

20                  How can we help? One of the ways we can help  
21    is a number of us have worked in foreign archives. We  
22    know what the British are releasing -- and the  
23    declassifiers should come to us and say, well, we're a  
24    little leery about releasing these kinds of sensitive  
25    documents that bear on NATO strategy in the 50's, but

1     what do you get on this stuff from European sources?  
2     And I can say, well, I saw such and such in the British  
3     archives, French archives they're releasing this and  
4     that, NATO itself has been declassifying documents just  
5     very, very recently through MC14 Section 3 -- NATO's  
6     documents have been coming out. It's that sort of give  
7     and take interaction, based on the sense that we're  
8     involved in a common process. And we're here to help  
9     each other -- that I think should form our basic  
10    approach to these issues.

11                 DR. GOLDBERG: Well, I am gratified that the  
12    panel members -- the academic members of this panel --  
13    have given as much thought to this problem as they have  
14    and I hope you will continue in the future. I hope the  
15    kind of interaction that you were talking about -- can  
16    it really take place? I know that you're all very busy  
17    people. There's always the question, how much time can  
18    you devote -- how much time will you devote to this  
19    sort of thing. This is the practical problem; it's  
20    another one of the pragmatic considerations which seems  
21    to me may be overriding in the whole process. Ernest?

22                 PROF. MAY: I just wanted to ask a question  
23    on this. Suppose that we were to recommend that  
24    Assistant Secretary Page that -- agrees to an order of  
25    priority based on Bob Wampler's list. Suppose that he

1       said that one of the -- the NFC files should have top  
2       priority. Then what happens? What's the actual  
3       procedure by which -- suppose that Secretary Page  
4       agreed to this and then what?

5               DR. GOLDBERG: That's a good question. It's  
6       a question of how much attention the services and  
7       others will pay to what Secretary Page says. He cannot  
8       -- he can tell them what he would like to see done; he  
9       cannot enforce the doing of it. They have their own  
10      priorities; they have their own resources; they have  
11      their own plans. And as you heard and you well know,  
12      orders coming from (inaudible) are not always  
13      observed -- sometimes in the breach. So we don't'  
14      really know.

15             On the other hand, we can certainly make the  
16      recommendations; we can urge OSD to put out a request  
17      or establish a priority, and then if we can do some  
18      policing thereafter, fine, but I wouldn't guarantee it.

19             MS. DAVIS-HARDING: If I could add to that.  
20      I could maybe go over the mechanical process that we  
21      envision, using the listing as an example. Once the  
22      panel here comes to an agreement on the priorities on  
23      that listing, we would then formally shoot it out to  
24      the DOD declassification management panel members who  
25      are comprised of all of the services and DOD agencies,

1       for comment, and give them maybe 30 days to coordinate  
2       that within their agencies and get us an official  
3       position on whether they feel that all or some or none  
4       of those topical areas or records should be  
5       declassified.

6               At that point, once we get the responses back  
7       from all of the agencies, then we would consolidate  
8       that information and come up with any issues where  
9       individual agencies non-concur in release of  
10      information, and then we would go through a process of  
11      raising the issue to the senior leadership within the  
12      Office of the Secretary of Defense to make sure that  
13      the senior leadership makes a DOD-wide decision on  
14      whether something should be released.

15             For example, if -- to pick on the Navy -- if  
16      the Navy said nonconcur in release of a particular  
17      topic and the DOD leadership felt that it was in the  
18      best interest of the Department to release that  
19      information, then the senior leadership within the  
20      department would override the Navy decision.

21             So the process would be a -- a process that  
22      would take into account all of the comments from all  
23      the DOD agencies on each one of the topical areas  
24      suggested, and then we would, through that process, get  
25      the -- get a decision from senior leadership. And we

1       could also envision at some point maybe calling in some  
2       of the historians or/and some of the dissenting  
3       agencies to justify why the information should not be  
4       declassified.

5               DR. GOLDBERG: This should give you some  
6       notion as to why it takes a long time to get things  
7       done. Dr. Horton?

8               DR. HORTON: If I could just something before  
9       I have to depart for another activity -- what Renee is  
10      describing, I would characterize as an attempt to  
11      develop a consensus from those who ultimately, as the  
12      doctor indicated, have the power to accept or reject  
13      that -- our recommendations. We are coming to what I  
14      might characterize as the first mid-term, and whatever  
15      the outcomes of the election, those who are in the  
16      permanent government have a tendency, as we all know,  
17      to sometimes treat those who are at the end of a term  
18      as lame ducks.

19              So if you really want this to be done and  
20      carried on into the next four years and beyond, what  
21      you've got to do is get involvement of players and  
22      their concurrence -- their buy-in, so the method that  
23      we create here now carries on to the end of this  
24      century and beyond. So that's what we're about -- once  
25      we get these recommendations is to get that consensus,

1 get that buy-in, get that commitment of all players  
2 throughout the bureaucracy. Thanks again to the panel  
3 for a green search. Good to see all of you.

4 PROF. LEFFLER: Could I just make one  
5 observation before you leave? It might be very  
6 difficult, as you say, a very cumbersome bureaucratic  
7 process to get all the agencies to agree, and as Dr.  
8 Goldberg said, to actually get them to comply. But I  
9 would suggest that it would be a wonderful thing for  
10 OSD itself to set an example with its own records,  
11 because if you're talking about those that are of  
12 greatest historical interest in terms of foreign  
13 policy, people in OSD have the opportunity to set a  
14 model for everybody, and I would encourage you to do  
15 so.

16 DR. HORTON: That's a fair challenge. I  
17 think we'll get arrested if (inaudible)

18 (laughter)

19 DR. GOLDBERG: Better stick around for four  
20 more years.

21 PROF. TRACHTENBERG: Can I just make a  
22 comment? In terms of the procedure. It seems to me  
23 that what we should do -- and I'm curious to get other  
24 people's reaction to this -- is ask the different  
25 agencies to come in with their -- you know, their fair

1 descriptions of what their holdings are, what the  
2 contents of their holdings are so that we can give this  
3 kind of input. We can ask them for presentations and  
4 then we could make our comments.

5 In the plans that went out, there was a great  
6 variation, you know, in terms of what was said -- of  
7 how the holdings were described. If you look at the  
8 Air Force plan, it's like -- their description of their  
9 files there that are except from immediate  
10 declassification or automatic declassification -- like  
11 whole record groups. Or they can't even give that,  
12 they just give the numbers. You can't give any input  
13 when that's all you're getting. You have to get it in  
14 so that there's some content to it, not file by file,  
15 but series.

16 DR. GOLDBERG: That's a preliminary step that  
17 could take a very long time though.

18 PROF. TRACHTENBERG: Well then -- then what  
19 are we supposed to do?

20 PROF. LEFFLER: We could at least identify  
21 ten priorities that we think are really important; come  
22 in describe them and just talk about them. I think  
23 trying to describe everything is too much, but to  
24 identify a few and to come in and talk and make some  
25 decisions is perfectly possible.

1           PROF. TRACHTENBERG: They knew what our  
2       general priorities are and on the basis of our general  
3       priorities, let them operationalize it in terms of plan  
4       for which specific files they're going to work on.

5           DR. GOLDBERG: So you would make as a first  
6       step establishment of general priorities, rather than  
7       specific ones and ask the services to come back and if  
8       possible, particularize what might be made available.

9           PROF. TRACHTENBERG: So that we can discuss  
10      it.

11          PROF. LEFFLER: Actually, I think the type of  
12      thing that Bob did for the OSD papers is what I'd like  
13      to see done for some of the other agencies -- to  
14      enumerate some of that. I mean that gives you some  
15      concrete notion of what we're talking about. So for to  
16      be too general is a way for us to sort of eviscerate  
17      our ability to do anything. So I would focus on  
18      getting some real enumeration of high priority files,  
19      record groups, within the general category, and to  
20      describe them for us and then let us -- let us have the  
21      input so that we can make our recommendations.

22          DR. GOLDBERG: Start with a single agency.

23          PROF. TRACHTENBERG: Can I just ask Bob how  
24      he got that RG-30 list?

25          DR. WAMPLER: Okay.

1                   PROF. TRACHTENBERG: Because how do we know  
2 those are the most important things.

3                   DR. WAMPLER: I said that these are  
4 illustrative of a much longer list, and this is my  
5 first selfish opinion of some things I think are  
6 important. Suitland, the National Records Center --  
7 you've got files and files and files of these things  
8 called From 135s, which are turned over to Suitland  
9 whenever an agency retires records there for storage,  
10 pending either destruction or transfer to the National  
11 Archives.

12                   OSD, DOD, has got some very detailed  
13 inventories of these. Also they've got a pretty good  
14 data base, computerized. You should be able to give  
15 them, let's say a time frame, and they can turn out for  
16 you, at least line item entries with accession numbers  
17 and the number of boxes that are say, in record group  
18 330 -- and also for some of the other services.

19                   Now anything you've kept within your own  
20 storage, I would imagine the JCS records at Ft. Ritchel  
21 or elsewhere -- they don't have any information on  
22 those yet because you haven't really transferred them,  
23 have you?

24                   OBSERVER: Some.

25                   DR. WAMPLER: But you can get a first cut, at

1     least, at the size of the problem, and you can get a  
2     listing that gives you the title, the dates, and how  
3     many boxes, and probably the location. And you can  
4     work from that and that would be the sort of  
5     information DOE had to work with. I mean, I just spent  
6     days going through the records out there, taking notes  
7     on what was available as part of other projects I'm  
8     working on, and I just culled this from a much, much  
9     longer list of everything that at least chronologically  
10    would fall in the purview of the Executive Order.

11               Now, the question I have -- you were talking  
12    about mechanics here -- logistics and resource  
13    allocation. Now you can fiddle around with your work  
14    plant on the basis of what we put forth in terms of our  
15    interests. I wonder how much wiggle room you're going  
16    to have, in terms of shifting your work plan, and then  
17    how much leeway do you think you've got in terms of the  
18    guidelines that are being developed by the new  
19    Executive Order for declassification?

20               I think we need more of a dialogue here than  
21    we can in an open session, over -- you know, when you  
22    get down to the nuts and bolts of really doing this,  
23    you know, how much leeway do you really feel you have?  
24    I mean if we kick in something on an issue where you  
25    feel that under the law, under the guidelines, you're

1 just going to look at it and say no, no, no, no, no.  
2 We need to know that. We need to feel if we're kicking  
3 something at you that you really have no flexibility on  
4 it at all, in order to make this process work.

5 DR. GOLDBERG: Brian Kinney handles  
6 declassification for OSD. How do you respond to that,  
7 Brian? What would happen if you had to -- somebody had  
8 to go through all the accessions?

9 MR. KINNEY: Well, I don't quite understand  
10 the question, but as I said before, I think you all  
11 have a good approach here and for Brian Kinney -- and  
12 I'm the one who does the declassification for OSD, and  
13 I've prepared a statement which I'd like to read at  
14 this point.

15 DR. GOLDBERG: Alright, and after you finish  
16 we'll take a break.

17 MR. KINNEY: But it will give you a feel for  
18 what's involved here. I feel very responsible for OSD  
19 records and I have a list -- I'm going to read this  
20 because I don't want to leave anything out.

21 DR. GOLDBERG: I think this is appropriate in  
22 view of the turn the discussion has taken.

23 MR. KINNEY: I have but a small staff of four  
24 personnel that has been performing systematic  
25 declassification review for the Office of the Secretary

1 of Defense since 1980. They've gone through most boxes  
2 of records from what accessions were at the Suitland  
3 Record Center for the years 1947-63. We're working on  
4 the 60-63 time frame when the new Executive Order came  
5 out.

6 Of those records we have declassified much  
7 and have extended a portion of them -- I'm not quite  
8 sure what the percentage -- maybe ten percent we  
9 extended. Our effort during the life of the office has  
10 always had to conform to the strictures of records  
11 management procedures and live with the fact that  
12 there's a significant percentage of other agency  
13 material interfiled with OSD records.

14 Often people get OSD mixed up with DOD and I  
15 want to make it clear that we're responsible for the  
16 Office of the Secretary of Defense records, not the DOD  
17 records.

18 We began operating under the rules of the new  
19 Executive Order on October 14, 1995 in an effort to (1)  
20 make forward progress during the transition, and (2) to  
21 see how the new rules would affect our review. We  
22 began this work despite slowly, evolving implementing  
23 guidance that is still not in place, despite the fact  
24 that Secretary Perry on behalf of the entire DOD asked  
25 for and was granted a six month extension to name the

1 files he proposed for exemption, despite the fact that  
2 there was obviously no immediate recommendations from  
3 the Herdal -- this committee -- or the information  
4 security policy advisory council mandated by the  
5 Executive Order.

6 Our experience during the last several months  
7 has been that we've had to make numerous changes to our  
8 procedures, and with assistance still evolving, we know  
9 we still need to be flexible to respond to future  
10 changes and further changes.

11 We eagerly await the implementing guidance  
12 most affecting us and to see what we will ultimately be  
13 reviewing when things sort out. So that in a nutshell  
14 is where I am and I hope it partially answers the  
15 question. We -- we're ready to do whatever and you all  
16 come up with priorities that you want to see worked on,  
17 we'll be happy to respond and try to do it.

18 However, I do have a small staff, as I  
19 emphasized, and if somebody comes up with something --  
20 a bunch of war planning information or whatever that  
21 they want to see declassified, we'll have to prioritize  
22 things because there are certain things that I know  
23 that I can't declassify and there's certain things that  
24 will bog me down to a standstill. And I want to go  
25 forward and review as much as I can. So -- that's

1       about all I had to say on it.

2               DR. GOLDBERG: So at the very least, you  
3       would be prepared to respond --

4               MR. KINNEY: Sure.

5               DR. GOLDBERG: -- to any list of priorities  
6       that this panel submitted to you and give us some  
7       explanation of what's involved in reviewing.

8               MR. KINNEY: Right.

9               MR. NORRIS: I'm Robert Norris. I'm a  
10       participant in the DOE advisory experience, and I'd  
11       just like to relate a concrete way of approaching this.  
12       This is where Bob Wampler started with with his model  
13       of doing things. And also Professor Trachtenberg, he  
14       makes the point that we can't do anything unless we  
15       know what's there and need a concrete list of things,  
16       which is what happened int the DOE experience.

17               A small group, maybe 15 or 20 people who  
18       participated, were given I think about 30 record  
19       groups, dates and what they contained, and basically we  
20       were told and voted on and after collating those  
21       different votes, a certain half dozen or eight rose to  
22       the top as the ones thai this group decided were the  
23       ones that should be attacked first, and they were  
24       attacked first, and that is the way we're proceeding  
25       right now. But we wouldn't have known what was there

1 without the presentation of the documents.

2 Now, DOD is much larger situation, and it's  
3 OSD and the services and on and on and on. But I think  
4 for the mechanics, the logistics of the thing, it is  
5 going to have to be a presentation from the different  
6 offices of what's available before you can proceed to  
7 identify as a panel here what should go first.

8 DR. GOLDBERG: Alright, suppose we take a ten  
9 minute break now.

10 (Whereupon, a brief period off the record  
11 ensued.)

12 DR. GOLDBERG: In order to better record the  
13 proceedings of this meeting, will those of you in the  
14 audience please stand when you are speaking, it will be  
15 easier to get your remarks and make certain that they  
16 can appear in the transcript? Ponnwitz?

17 COL. PONNWITZ: Yes, I'd like to make one  
18 comment -- an observation, really. You know, as the  
19 only uniformed representative here from a service, I'm  
20 pretty familiar with the kind of records we hold -- and  
21 we have our chief archivist Fred Graboske here who's  
22 going to make a comment after I do.

23 What -- when we look at Dr. Wampler's list,  
24 we don't really hold, as a service, a lot of these  
25 policy decision matters. We hold contingency plans; we

1 hold operational records; we hold the kinds of things  
2 that are derived from these policy decisions. Our  
3 fifteen percent, then, can focus to certain operations  
4 that were derivatives of these policy decisions that  
5 may help, but they're not going to answer the questions  
6 you want.

7 The priorities you have here really take the  
8 fifteen percent and dump the majority of that fifteen  
9 percent to OSD, the higher levels of the Department of  
10 Defense, where if you want that information from them  
11 on these policy matters, they have to do the majority  
12 of the work first. Unfortunately, that's not the way  
13 the system is structured with resources to support this  
14 effort. We all have our own archivist; we all have our  
15 own archival records; we all have our own fifteen  
16 percent of the resource that we can contribute -- and  
17 it's going to be at our level because we can only  
18 declassify the records that we originated. We can't  
19 declassify a record that OSD has originated.

20 So there's a little bit of a conflict here  
21 between the way the priorities are going to be  
22 structured, and the way the resources are allocated.  
23 In the Persian Gulf Syndrome declassification effort,  
24 there was sufficient resources allocated to change the  
25 structure. We got money to do that. With this effort,

1 we don't. We can only use the resources that are  
2 currently available to us now.

3 Now Fred Graboske, our chief archivist, would  
4 like to add a suggestion, and I would ask him to do  
5 that at this time.

6 MR. GRABOSKE: Well, first let me kind of put  
7 things in perspective for you -- and that calls for  
8 both the Executive Order implementation and the Gulf  
9 War. The Department of Defense is spending, I would  
10 guess, \$10,000,000 this year on the declassification of  
11 about 20,000,000 pages. There is not one penny  
12 budgeted for the billion pages we have to declassify  
13 under the Executive Order. So we really have a  
14 resource problem. And so I'd like to comment on the  
15 suggestions I've heard about us providing a list of  
16 what we consider the priorities to be declassified.

17 If you ask us to do that, you're taking our  
18 time away from declassification. Let me kind of turn  
19 the tables on you and suggest that you do some  
20 research. Go to the National Archives or the National  
21 Records Center, get copies of the 0-1 reports, the  
22 computer printouts from every record group held in  
23 classified stacks -- stacks one, two, and three.  
24 They're done by record group and it was every accession  
25 in those record groups. If you see something that

1 strikes your interest, go on out to the record center  
2 and look at the Standard Form 135 that lists all the  
3 folder titles in every box in that particular  
4 accession. Then come back to us and say, hey, you know  
5 RG-127, which is the Marine Corps records, and this  
6 particular accession 65-8599, boxes 42 through 49 look  
7 like they're really interesting. Could you focus on  
8 those?

9 And if you tell us that, you're more than  
10 likely to get a positive response, because we're making  
11 our plans to five years, and if you tell us right up  
12 front what you're interested in, specifically by  
13 accession and boxes, then maybe we can devote our  
14 resources to those particular boxes and get them to you  
15 quickly.

16 I see Cuban Missile Crisis is one of your  
17 particular interests. Okay, those records have been  
18 declassified -- all our records from the Cuban Missile  
19 Crisis have already been declassified. We're waiting  
20 to ship them to the Kennedy Assassination Records  
21 Review Board which has demanded them. That's one of  
22 the problems -- demands for our resources. So as soon  
23 as we finish that, we'll retire the records to the  
24 National Archives and you can go look at them there.

25 But you know, that's my suggestions.

1 DR. GOLDBERG: How extensive are your  
2 accession list? How long would it take to go through  
3 an accession list for the Marine Corps. It may be even  
4 longer for the other services, but how about the Marine  
5 Corps?

6 MR. GRABOSKE: Our accession lists comprise  
7 13 binders -- that's about 4,000,000 pages, several  
8 hundred accessions. It covers materials from World War  
9 II through mid-eighties. It would take you a little  
10 bit of time, but if you would just start with the 0-1  
11 reports, computer generated by the records center --  
12 which by record 127 -- look at RG-127, look at the list  
13 of accessions, some you're not going to be interested  
14 in. Files in general (inaudible) 1950-52 you're  
15 probably not much interested in.

16 But the operation records, the war diaries,  
17 the command diaries that were generated back three,  
18 four years from World War II through 1964 when the  
19 series changed -- those are in the record center. You  
20 can find those in several different accessions. If  
21 you're interested in them, go to the SF-135 or come to  
22 my archive and look at the SF-135s, and we can get  
23 stuff declassified for you.

24 DR. GOLDBERG: Do you think it would be  
25 useful to have representatives of the major elements of

1 the services, OSD and JCS give us here, perhaps at our  
2 next meeting, a notion of what you have. People here  
3 have been asking for inventories, for lists, et cetera.  
4 I know that is a near-impossibility, but would it be  
5 possible to get the essence of the sort of thing you  
6 have, especially at the levels in which people here are  
7 interested in this information?

8 MR. GRABOSKE: I would suggest the National  
9 Archives could do that. This is a joint effort between  
10 us and the National Archives. The 0-1 reports are  
11 generated by the Washington National Records Center.

12 DR. GOLDBERG: MS. Schauble?

13 MS. SCHAUBLE: Yes, I'd like to make a  
14 comment on that. The Washington National Records  
15 Center holds a majority, I guess, of the records that  
16 are still in the agency custody. These 0-1 reports are  
17 going to be very extensive, not only that, but not all  
18 the records that will be in the records center are yet  
19 scheduled as to whether they are permanent or not. And  
20 of course we could only be focusing on permanent  
21 records for the purposes of this Executive Order.

22 I produced a list of all the classified  
23 series that have been accessioned in the National  
24 Archives, and that comes out to something like four  
25 inches of paper -- and I don't think that's as much as

1 are actually in the records center.

2 DR. GOLDBERG: How did you get it down to  
3 four inches?

4 MS. SCHAUBLE: Small print. I would be happy  
5 to work with you in -- as a liaison with the records  
6 center. I'm not sure that the center is really set up  
7 to provide access to the committee members to their  
8 records of 135s and so on. I would also say that as  
9 part of our moving to our new building, a lot of those  
10 records that are in the records center that had been  
11 scheduled for accessioning by the archives through 1995  
12 and the accessioning had been postponed for various  
13 reasons, are being moved into the archives now.

14 As a matter of fact, as we speak, we are in  
15 the process of bringing some of those records in. That  
16 creates a bit of a problem for this group because  
17 they're going off the record center rolls and onto  
18 mine, so to speak, and there's going to be a period of  
19 transition while I get them into my database and get  
20 figured out as to what exactly we have.

21 So, I would suggest that in terms of -- in  
22 those terms, you might want to work with me as a  
23 liaison with the records center.

24 DR. GOLDBERG: How close to date is that  
25 accessioning now? In general?

1 MS. SCHAUBLE: We are going to still be  
2 moving records probably through about the middle of  
3 April, and at that point we would have brought in  
4 everything that the agencies have agreed for us to  
5 bring in at this time.

6 DR. GOLDBERG: How far is that going to make  
7 you set beyond?

8 MS. SCHAUBLE: Some of it -- most of it  
9 probably is within the time period of this Executive  
10 Order. Some of it may go a bit beyond. Whether it  
11 would cover everything in the center that is subject to  
12 the Order, I don't know, because as I say, it's only  
13 what the agencies have actually agreed for us to take  
14 at this point.

15 DR. GOLDBERG: Thank you. Ms. Smith? We are  
16 hearing now here from the Presidential Libraries, an  
17 area, I think that most scholars are very much  
18 interested in, and one which certainly holds high level  
19 policy materials. Would you stand, please?

20 MS. SMITH: Yes. I don't want to feel like  
21 I'm beating a dead horse with this group, but in  
22 November, I went over the fact that the Presidential  
23 Libraries do hold a small group of high level policy  
24 papers -- that we come under the Executive Order. The  
25 archivist is entrusted with the declassification of

1     those materials, and we would really like this group to  
2     consider some way of attacking the 7,000,000-plus  
3     classified materials in the Presidential Libraries.

4             In December, the archivist sent out a plan to  
5     each one of the intelligence groups for proposing  
6     250,000 items at three libraries dealing with Viet-Nam  
7     and Eastern Europe -- they're from the National  
8     Security files, so they sort of go with Dr. Wampler's  
9     idea, but they also -- they're from a file, but they  
10    also deal with the subject. They would be easy to  
11    declassify; they're extremely high policy level. As  
12    yet we really have not gotten any feed-back from you  
13    all in terms of how you want to respond to that plan.

14            The archivist said that we're more than  
15    willing to listen to something else. If you want to  
16    attack the 80,000 at Truman -- the 80,000 classified  
17    items at Truman, the 250,000 at Eisenhower and do a  
18    whole Presidential collection, we can go that way, but  
19    we really -- really want this group in some way to  
20    attack the high policy level materials at the  
21    Presidential Libraries have and in some way address  
22    those so that the archivist can comply with the  
23    Executive Order and get something declassified in the  
24    first year dealing with Presidential papers.

25            Of course, they have multiple equities,

1       involve coordination. NARA, the Presidential Libraries  
2       will have to coordinate multiple decisions, but we are  
3       interested in working with you all in any way we can to  
4       address this. We have sent each one of the  
5       intelligence agencies specific planning aids -- they're  
6       much larger than the four inches that Jeanne is talking  
7       about -- we couldn't get it down in as small a print.  
8       But I think we can give this group any more specific  
9       knowledge that they want, if there are other ways they  
10      want to go, but we'd just like to be part of your  
11      consideration.

12               MS. DAVIS-HARDING: That was sent to the  
13      intelligence community? Did you send it to --

14               MS. SMITH: Pardon?

15               MS. DAVIS-HARDING: The listing -- your  
16      listing -- your recommended listing?

17               MS. SMITH: Who did we send it to?

18               MS. DAVIS-HARDING: Yes.

19               MS. SMITH: Well, I'd have the copies because  
20      it seems -- it's one interesting thing to me is that  
21      every intelligence meeting I've been to, the agencies  
22      keep telling me I haven't sent it to them, but I sent  
23      it to Dave Whitman at OSD -- you want me to go through  
24      all the different names?

25               MS. DAVIS-HARDING: No, that name's in my

1 office.

2 MS. SMITH: My office is right next door and  
3 I have each different person in the military that I  
4 sent it to -- Rich Warshot (ph), CIA -- you want me to  
5 keep going?

6 MS. DAVIS-HARDING: No --

7 MS. SMITH: So that plan has gone out.

8 PROF. LEFFLER: Have you had any responses?

9 MS. SMITH: The one response that we have,  
10 and I was telling Dr. Trachtenberg about it, is that  
11 CIA is proposing to the various intelligence  
12 communities a way of dealing with presidential papers,  
13 and this is a proposal which is to scan presidential  
14 papers, put them on an optical disk -- the agency would  
15 bring them back , and then we would -- they would be  
16 involved in transferring equities to other agencies and  
17 the libraries would coordinate the declassification  
18 decisions. And that plan would involve the other  
19 intelligence agencies buying into it.

20 We've had several meetings on it. It is  
21 still at the talking stage. NARA's feeling on that  
22 plan is we're more than willing to listen. We have  
23 preservation concerns of that screening, but certainly  
24 the agency has indicated to us that they're more than  
25 willing to cooperate with that. And several of the

1 agencies have indicated interest because it's working  
2 out cheaper to do that sort of plan and buy into that,  
3 than it would be to do onsite review.

4 I really don't care. We just want to see  
5 something declassified, and if the plan works and the  
6 preservation of the documents is good -- and I think  
7 CIA is willing to work with that -- with us on that --  
8 we will be more than cooperative.

9 We believed onsite review of the Presidential  
10 Libraries was the way to go and we've had a few  
11 situations with onsite reviews that worked extremely  
12 well. Iran Contra sat over at the OJ and amazingly  
13 enough, the reviewers from the different agencies were  
14 given the authority to make a review decision on Iran  
15 Contra documents, so we know it can work.

16 But if it's too expensive to go to  
17 Presidential Libraries, then this other proposal is a  
18 real option. What we have proposed is that they do the  
19 250,000 or small number of items the first year so that  
20 we can see if the technology is really working, and  
21 they have come back and said maybe one library would be  
22 better than three different libraries because we  
23 proposed collections in Kennedy, Johnson, and Ford. So  
24 we said, okay, we'll up it at Johnson which has the  
25 largest amount we're proposing for the first year and a

1 larger staff, in this particular case, to deal with it.

2 So that is now the only real discussion  
3 that's going on right now -- that I've been involved in  
4 in terms of some response on this issue. And I've also  
5 heard a lot of we know you're out there -- Presidential  
6 papers contain multiple equities, you're too expensive  
7 to visit, and we'll deal with you at four and a half  
8 years.

9 DR. GOLDBERG: As an aside if we observe that  
10 all of you will speak up as well as Ms. Smith does, you  
11 won't have to stand.

12 MS. SMITH: That's why I did not stand.

13 DR. GOLDBERG: You did very well. Are the  
14 Presidential Libraries willing and capable of doing  
15 this?

16 MS. SMITH: We really want to do this. We do  
17 not have large staffs, but it is extremely expensive to  
18 maintain the classification on our documents which are  
19 over 25 years old, and we believe that what we proposed  
20 are 80-85 percent documents that you all will  
21 declassify, and that will make researchers happy, like  
22 Professor Trachtenberg. So, yes.

23 You know, are we going to have problems in  
24 terms of our resources in coordinating four --  
25 sometimes four different decisions which as no surprise

1 to you all, may not match up at all? Well, we've been  
2 doing it for years. It's on a much larger scale.  
3 There will be some time lag from the time we get the  
4 documents back to coordinating it, but we will make our  
5 best effort.

6 DR. GOLDBERG: Well, it seems to me that this  
7 panel would certainly welcome what you propose and  
8 support it and perhaps help provide some guidance.  
9 Is -- we probably couldn't get to any high level of  
10 policy, and if we could relate it to OSD, perhaps JCS,  
11 I think we certainly would have the highest levels and  
12 perhaps we ought to think in terms of some kind of a  
13 pilot project, initially, which you give us some notion  
14 of what is possible and what is not possible to be  
15 done. I'd like to hear some reactions.

16 DR. CLARKE: I'd like to -- the Marine  
17 archivist pointed out that as soon as you get into  
18 scanning redaction -- declassification right on a  
19 scanning document, that gets extremely expensive. Do  
20 you really have money to --

21 MS. SMITH: Let me make it very clear. NARA  
22 is not the one who is proposing this scanning proposal.  
23 The CIA is the one who is proposing and has come to  
24 NARA and put this on the table, and they are the ones  
25 who seem to have the money to implement this proposal.

1       What we are saying as an agency is we're more than  
2       willing to work with you and listen to a possible  
3       alternative. And they feel they have the -- when you  
4       look at going out and doing onsite review, and the fact  
5       that DOD wants to look at every presidential paper that  
6       is security classified, if you're doing that -- if you  
7       can't implement the Executive Order without looking at  
8       every one of our 7,000,000 pages, then probably  
9       scanning is the less expensive proposition than doing  
10      onsite interagency --

11               DR. CLARKE: The CIA would establish a  
12      scanning center, say --

13               MS. SMITH: Yes.

14               DR. CLARKE: -- at the presidential library  
15      that other agencies could --

16               MS. SMITH: They would go to the libraries to  
17      scan, come back here, and then what we were talking  
18      about at the last group meeting was that agencies could  
19      either -- if they buy into this -- and I am not the CIA  
20      spokesperson here, I'm just telling you of a plan --  
21      you could either go out to where the redaction center  
22      is or they would give you diskettes that would have,  
23      say, all the Truman classified presidential papers on  
24      that diskette. It is still in the talking stage, but --  
25      -

1                   BG. ARMSTRONG: Let me -- I'm Dave Armstrong,  
2 I'm a Historian. I am not an archivist, and I think,  
3 quite honestly, that's one of the problems this group  
4 is having. Because if we're talking about archival  
5 matters, it takes an archivist to talk knowledgeably  
6 about the nuts and bolts of doing things in an archive.

7                   It seems to me that what the historical --  
8 the academic historical community wants and what the  
9 archival bureaucracy -- the people who have to do the  
10 declassification -- are capable of producing is --  
11 we're not making connection between what Professor  
12 Leffler wants and what the Marine Corps is saying. And  
13 I would suggest that that connection can only be made  
14 if the academic community -- Dr. Wampler, whoever --  
15 the individuals in it who are interested in the  
16 particular set of records, whether they're OSD, JCS or  
17 some service records, contact the archival people  
18 responsible for those sets of records and find out what  
19 is the nature of the general descriptive listings that  
20 those people keep, and then work from there to specify  
21 amongst those listings, what particularly they would  
22 like to see first in the queue for declassification.

23                   I'm emphasizing archivists, as they've  
24 repeatedly said, they have a problem. They have a 15  
25 percent mandate to do. Period. And they have to do

1     that. And so what you're asking for which is perfectly  
2     reasonable from my point of view as a historian, has to  
3     be matched up with this mandate -- and they have  
4     workloads to juggle and so forth.

5             I'm very serious about suggesting to the  
6     historical community -- what has to be done is a lot of  
7     work, quite frankly, on the part of the historians who  
8     are interested in access to particular records. This  
9     is like telling a graduate student and go out, like  
10    Bill Holly did to me 30 years ago, threw me in the  
11    archives and basically said, you know, go in there and  
12    find where this information is. And until you do that,  
13    I don't think you're going to be able to make a  
14    connection between what you want in terms of getting  
15    your interests first in the declassification queue and  
16    what the people charged with doing the work are capable  
17    of doing.

18            Now, I would be perfectly happy to get the  
19    Joint Staffs people, the documents people, here next  
20    time to talk to you about JCS records. They have gone  
21    through systematic declassification up through '63, and  
22    I believe they are now accession -- those records are  
23    available or at least positioned in the National  
24    Archives.

25            Since that time the records sit out at Fort

1       Ritchie. Now, those records, there is a degree of  
2       specificity about what's in those files. The JCS  
3       files up to 1986 or so were very carefully organized  
4       because of the idiosyncracies of the organization. And  
5       we can get you that kind of information, I think.

6               But I would simply try to emphasize to you  
7       that as historians, you're used to dealing with the  
8       specific, and the problems you face here are specific,  
9       and they're idiosyncratic to each organizational set of  
10      records, and I really do think that trying to get this  
11      group to establish sort of general priorities -- I  
12      don't think you're going to make the connection between  
13      what you want and the people who actually do the work.

14             DR. DUDLEY: Now if -- I would endorse what  
15      Dr. Armstrong is saying, and my concern as representing  
16      the Naval History Center and Naval history in general,  
17      is that the impact of a different set of priorities on  
18      top of our capabilities -- our capabilities are very  
19      strained, very limited in terms of declassification.  
20      The initial burden of Desert Storm declassification  
21      program, which is immediate, and which is dealing with  
22      events that only three -- four or five years ago -- is  
23      going to consume us for a while, at least at the center  
24      and with regards to some other particular locations.

25             The Navy system for declassification is

1 decentralized. Each location has a very limited number  
2 of people who can work this problem, so I see that  
3 there's a potential tension here, existing tension,  
4 which may be relaxed -- and I'm certainly willing to  
5 listen to priorities coming from the academic side.

6 In order to be a little more specific,  
7 though, I'd like to ask Mike Brown from the C&O's  
8 Information Security Oversight Team, to make a  
9 statement.

10 DR. GOLDBERG: Will you also ask him to stand  
11 up, please?

12 DR. DUDLEY: I will do that.

13 MR. BROWN: I am in a position of making a  
14 security profession here. I am neither a historian or  
15 an archivist by profession. But I've dealt with  
16 declassification as an issue for many years. We  
17 submitted our declassification plan and we got the  
18 requisite blessing on it -- they said we did very  
19 well -- good plan. That's what we were striving for.

20 We have a plan. We haven't finished that  
21 plan. We haven't identified a series of exempt records  
22 yet. We have begun a process, and this process has  
23 been ongoing, well, since June. In taking this  
24 decentralized process and trying to bring those records  
25 in together and determine how they're going to achieve

1     their part of the 15 percent -- and that' s the goal.  
2     That's the goal that they're striving for. And this is  
3     the kind of information that you're probably not  
4     interested in, because we're going to have the people  
5     in NAFC (ph) looking at what they can declassify in  
6     1950's technology -- on weapons systems.

7             Similarly, for the people who do aircraft.  
8     They're going to be looking at the technology of  
9     aircraft. They're not looking at political decisions.  
10    They're not looking at procurement decisions. Those  
11    are by and large declassified by now, anyway.

12            So they're approaching this thing in a -- in  
13    a very narrow focus, which is the only way that they  
14    can do it -- they can't start looking at broader  
15    spectrum -- they have to concentrate on their area of  
16    responsibility.

17            Resources, Desert Storm, POW-MIA and the  
18    other directed efforts. We have a dilemma here, in our  
19    need to do, to comply with the Executive Order  
20    requirement. And we also have some directed actions  
21    come down from the Secretary of Defense that said,  
22    we'll concentrate on doing this and okay, we'll have to  
23    bring all our resources if we start concentrating on  
24    those efforts. We still have some other things to do.

25            I think that our plan that we put together

1 was a pretty good plan. At a meeting we held yesterday  
2 that Dr. Dudley attended -- mechanic went over all  
3 these things. Ray Schmidt who had been probably  
4 described in very great detail what's contained in  
5 records or what's not identified. I asked the group at  
6 large (1), has the declassification factory turned out  
7 anything yet. And the answer is no. Not a single  
8 product has rolled off the assembly line. (2) Can you  
9 target a subject if we give you a subject to go after?  
10 The overall response was no.

11 Now, again, I'm not a historian. I'm not an  
12 archivist. So I'm not that familiar with the  
13 precision, the specificity, that the records are  
14 identified by means of the 135 and other depictions.  
15 But what I have seen is that they are very, very  
16 generalized kinds of things, so all you can do is focus  
17 on the records of an activity, for a time point, and  
18 not target a subject.

19 DR. GOLDBERG: I think that what you  
20 indicated is that this panel would probably not be  
21 interested initially in giving priority to some of the  
22 things that you mentioned.

23 MR. BROWN: Exactly.

24 DR. GOLDBERG: That said of the agencies,  
25 would you imagine this panel would be interested in the

1 Navy and the Office of the Secretary of the Navy, the  
2 Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, that's  
3 different. This is where policy is made, and this is  
4 where the focus of this panel will probably be in  
5 establishing priorities. Did you want to say  
6 something?

7 PROF. LEFFLER: Did I want to say something?

8 DR. GOLDBERG: Yes.

9 PROF. LEFFLER: Not right now, thanks.

10 DR. GOLDBERG: I thought I saw you -- yes.

11 MR. DAVIS: I accept the invitation to review  
12 planning aides in 105 at the National Archives and 135s  
13 in the record center. But there's a gap here, and that  
14 is there's very little information available to the  
15 public on holdings still in the physical custody of DOD  
16 components. For example, the Army Intelligence and  
17 Security Commands, per its handouts last November --  
18 listed about 7000 feet of records, but to the best of  
19 my knowledge, there's no information publicly available  
20 on the dates of these records, classification status,  
21 types of records and so on and so forth.

22 And that's, I think, something that needs to  
23 be addressed, because at this point the public, for the  
24 most part, can determine what's in the National Archive  
25 system, what's in the record center system, but cannot

1 determine what records are still in physical custody of  
2 these various DOD components.

3 And I think if the panel can identify in  
4 specific offices and organizations' records that are of  
5 interest, that will greatly assist in the  
6 identification of specific collections -- let's take  
7 for example, two or three entries in the record group  
8 in the National Archives of 100 or 125 accessions in  
9 some record group at the record center. But without  
10 that focus, it's -- I wouldn't say an impossible task,  
11 but an overwhelming task.

12 So, for example, if the focus wants to be --  
13 focuses on the outset on OSD records, that greatly  
14 narrows the search.

15 DR. GOLDBERG: I think this is probably the  
16 disposition of the panel, to focus on particular  
17 offices and organizations. It seems to me that the nub  
18 of all of this is how do we start here? Do we want to  
19 explore first and find out more about what is there?  
20 What are the things that we're interested in that we  
21 find out about? And then do something about it. Or do  
22 we want to start with some kind of a pilot project and  
23 say these are subjects that we would like to see looked  
24 at, given priority in the records of: the Office of the  
25 Secretary of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff and

1 especially the Presidential Libraries? These are the  
2 kinds of decisions you have to make.

3 Today, do we want to make up a list of  
4 recommendations and in priority order, and say this is  
5 what we would like to see done, and then forward it up  
6 the line and wait to hear from it? Or do we want to  
7 find out more about what is there and what the  
8 procedures are and what the possibilities are? This  
9 involves having some knowledge of where our  
10 recommendations go and what might happen to them.

11 I, personally, think it would be a good idea  
12 for some of us to establish direct relations with some  
13 of the offices and organizations that we'd like to see  
14 declassifying specific areas that we might prescribe or  
15 ask for, would be more accurate. I'd like your  
16 reaction to this. Are we prepared to make some  
17 specific recommendations at this point or do we want to  
18 make some further preparations and explorations so that  
19 we may have a much better informed proposal to make at  
20 the next meeting or at the one after that? Yes.

21 PROF. TRACHTENBERG: Well I like the idea of  
22 a pilot project because first of all, it enables us to  
23 focus in on the issues that are at least the crowning  
24 concerns of the historians, plus also, in the process  
25 of working out a pilot project, we'd be able to come to

1 grips with all kinds of general problems that are going  
2 to be faced throughout the whole effort. And the whole  
3 idea on focusing on OSD, Presidential Libraries, JCS,  
4 makes sense for obvious reasons.

5           The other thing I was going to say is I think  
6 it's great to hear from archivists saying, you know,  
7 come talk with us and tell us what your priorities are,  
8 something very easy that we can do along those lines.  
9 I think, get the names, addresses and phone numbers of  
10 the relevant contact people that can be disseminated to  
11 practicing historians because we -- in terms of our own  
12 work -- are a very small proportion of a very large  
13 profession, and it would be very nice to kind of get  
14 this information out so that people can go through the  
15 process that you outlined and speak with you. Because  
16 you know, it's a very big bureaucracy; it's very hard  
17 to kind of target the right people, and people get  
18 frustrated.

19           And I can say also that there is a certain  
20 variation in terms of how receptive different  
21 archivists are. Your attitude, I thought, was  
22 wonderful, but I can tell you that that's not what we  
23 encounter on a uniform basis. Sometimes it's quite  
24 frustrating. So just going through the process of  
25 identifying people who are receptive would be of

1 enormous value. So that's on the one hand.

2 The other hand is proceeding with a pilot  
3 project of the sort of thing Al Goldberg just  
4 described. Here the question is how to proceed?

5 DR. GOLDBERG: That's what I wrote down.

6 PROF. TRACHTENBERG: And there are at least  
7 two basic choices, you know. Who is going to take the  
8 lead? We can go your route -- historians can go and  
9 get these forms and so on and say this is where we  
10 think priority emphasis should be placed.

11 My own preference would be to kind of go the  
12 other way and have a presentation, kind of giving a  
13 general description of the holdings, and then a general  
14 philosophy of where efforts are going to be  
15 concentrated, and then -- and then open issues. These  
16 are the specifics where we would like you to give us  
17 advice. Here is some typical problems of a concrete  
18 nature. Tell us -- tell us -- you know, give us some  
19 sort of feedback. This is our inclination, or this is  
20 an open issue -- but the -- but instead of asking the  
21 historians to kind of go and do this work, I think it  
22 would be much more efficient to have the main thinking  
23 going on among the archivists who then would have  
24 specific problems in mind that they could just come to  
25 us with, and then our advice would fall on prepared

1 ears.

2 COL. PONNWITZ: Just remember we're still  
3 plodding along with our fifteen percent, and each day  
4 we do another percentage of that 15 percent, whether we  
5 get guidance or not. To come -- any time that we have  
6 to pull the archivist off his task to come up with  
7 these problems and everything else to educate the  
8 panel, is part of that 15 percent that doesn't get  
9 done. And we're not going to be -- our compliance with  
10 the Executive Order says do 15 percent.

11 Now we hope that eventually we'll get the  
12 right 15 percent, but for the services, from what I'm  
13 hearing here, anything we tell you is not going to  
14 satisfy what you want anyway because we just don't have  
15 it.

16 Now the other agencies perhaps do, and maybe  
17 if you focus on the prime agencies first that you want  
18 information from in that order, the higher level  
19 government agencies, and certainly the suggestion that  
20 the CIA has for the Presidential Libraries is excellent  
21 for that kind of policy, we cannot scan all the  
22 information we have, nor would we want to because it's  
23 not economically possible for us, nor would it help you  
24 get any data that you particularly need.

25 But I think if we set the priorities in

1 certain categories and don't burden everybody with the  
2 same priority determination, we'll get to the thing,  
3 the conclusion, you want a lot quicker, a lot more  
4 efficiently.

5 PROF. TRACHTENBERG: I don't want to burden  
6 people. I think that these -- people who have been  
7 working with this problem -- they know what the  
8 problems are. They can come in with scarcely any  
9 preparation at all and give a presentation just the way  
10 any of us can on the basis of what our current work is,  
11 and then -- then it would provide a framework for  
12 interaction.

13 The -- and that's why focusing on OSD, JCS  
14 makes sense.

15 DR. GOLDBERG: You are aware that marines  
16 carry out orders better than anybody else.

17 PROF. TRACHTENBERG: We don't give orders.

18 DR. GOLDBERG: I'm not talking about our  
19 orders, the ones they already have.

20 PROF. LEFFLER: I want to endorse what Mark  
21 Trachtenberg said. I think that we should focus on  
22 three things: First, carrying out a plan for the  
23 Presidential Libraries and underscoring the importance  
24 of grappling with those materials because they're  
25 clearly the ones that least -- ostensibly relate to

1 high policy.

2 And secondly, focusing on the Office of the  
3 Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I  
4 think that's a very good beginning.

5 And these allusions to you know, making a  
6 preparation for us and taking away from 15 percent,  
7 don't strike me as terribly persuasive because what  
8 we're asking for is a presentation that should take  
9 somebody sort of two hours to prepare. We want a sort  
10 of -- some type of survey of what you, who deal with  
11 the records, think are the most important record groups  
12 that deal with high policy making and what are the  
13 particular problems that might inhere in the  
14 declassification of those documents.

15 To those of you who have spent years and  
16 years working with these records, it doesn't seem to me  
17 that this should be a voluminous assignment. It's  
18 something that we want to hear your best judgement on  
19 so you can inform us so that you can then go ahead and  
20 declassify these very records that you are most  
21 interested in.

22 So I think that's a very good way to proceed.

23 DR. GOLDBERG: It depends on whose most  
24 interesting -- your most interest does not necessarily  
25 mean that the declassifier's are. But on the subject

1 of Presidential Libraries, would you be interested in  
2 visiting some of them?

3 PROF. LEFFLER: No, I have been to almost all  
4 of them. I don't need to go back to them.

5 DR. GOLDBERG: No, for this purpose, to find  
6 out what it is that ought to be declassified.

7 PROF. LEFFLER: Well --

8 DR. GOLDBERG: Or any other panel members  
9 interested in such visits?

10 MS. SMITH: Well, I mean we're more than  
11 willing to have onsite visits, but I think that we have  
12 -- we can provide this group with very good knowledge  
13 if I know what you all want. We have provided what we  
14 think is the most sensible plan which deals with  
15 VietNam and Eastern Europe and national security files  
16 of the Kennedy, Johnson and Ford libraries. I can give  
17 you the breakdowns for Truman, Eisenhower. I can tell  
18 you what they have. We can write back to you -- if you  
19 wanted this at one of the libraries, that's great too.

20 PROF. TRACHTENBERG: About the -- the general  
21 philosophy of how to do this. It doesn't make sense to  
22 start with the oldest stuff first and then just kind of  
23 move forward -- the oldest stuff systematically so we  
24 get the sense of an inexorable tide sweeping its way  
25 through the --

1 MS. SMITH: Well, there was a method to our  
2 madness. We sort of thought that too. In our plan, by  
3 the way, we have the Hoover library which is 22,000  
4 classified materials and also contains a bunch of Louis  
5 Straus's files -- he was chair of the Atomic Energy  
6 Commission -- and those materials would largely be  
7 exempt from declassification.

8 But basically, we picked the three libraries  
9 we did and the sublibraries we did because the  
10 Eisenhower library have some duplicative material that  
11 the National Archives has, that we are hopeful will get  
12 declassified and so were trying to prevent the agencies  
13 from doing duplicative declassification efforts. So we  
14 were staggering the Eisenhower library, hoping that the  
15 declassification effort would be done in the office of  
16 the National Archives material and then we would do  
17 Eisenhower the second year.

18 The Truman library we could start out at the  
19 Truman library; the Johnson library, one reason we  
20 picked the Johnson library, it has 150,000 items held  
21 out for VietNam and Eastern Europe. They're already  
22 segregated; they're very ready for review and we have  
23 had huge research interest in VietNam, Soviet Europe  
24 and Eastern European countries. So then the Ford  
25 library said, well, we're very ready and the Kennedy

1 library said we're very ready on this issue, and it was  
2 sort of like we were getting feedback to respond to Dr.  
3 Goldberg in terms of how we could best serve the  
4 declassifiers to be sure that their time was wisely  
5 used.

6 But we can go -- if you want to go with the  
7 older libraries, we can do Eisenhower and Truman. I  
8 mean we're very flexible. We too, have a resource  
9 component, so we were figuring that into our plan too  
10 as to where we would be most ready.

11 DR. GOLDBERG: You have already proposed a  
12 plan. Now what can this panel do to complement that,  
13 to support it, to add to it, perhaps?

14 MS. SMITH: Well, I think that maybe someone  
15 from the panel should be involved in this group that  
16 Ray and several of the other of us in the room are  
17 involved in with the CIA in terms of optical scanning.  
18 I think that might be interesting to see if -- if that  
19 is the way to go. That would be one thing I would  
20 suggest.

21 Another thing is that the group endorse the  
22 plan, if you agree with the plan, and try to put  
23 resources in terms of doing the plan in those three  
24 libraries. I think that DOD has already indicated its  
25 agreement with the CIA scanning proposal. I don't know

1 exactly.

2 DR. GOLDBERG: Can we add subjects and  
3 establish priorities?

4 MS. SMITH: Yes, you can add subjects. You  
5 can -- but all I'm saying is I don't think it takes a  
6 visit to a Presidential Library, because you tell me  
7 the subjects and I can go out to the libraries and get  
8 you the information back. I can get you detailed  
9 lists, searches, whatever.

10 You can have libraries, if you -- or some one  
11 wanted to go older, we could go older. We were just  
12 holding it out for certain reasons.

13 DR. WAMPLER: Essentially your work plan is  
14 based on their data base and DOD equity documents that  
15 have been pulled from the accession records in each of  
16 the libraries?

17 MS. SMITH: These were very, very ready  
18 materials and we -- we proposed for several different  
19 reasons -- research interest, readiness, and the  
20 likelihood that most of the stuff would be  
21 declassified, wouldn't be exempt from declassification.  
22 So that was why we pulled these areas -- Eastern  
23 Europe, it's changed; VietNam, it's changed. We know  
24 from what we're sending in on inventory review that  
25 we're getting a high rate of declassification on these

1 areas, and we have tremendous amount of research  
2 interest. But we're more than flexible. If this group  
3 wants to go some other way, you all just need to tell  
4 me what you want me to give you lists on and I can  
5 pretty much give you the list.

6 DR. WAMPLER: Is it organized according to  
7 the way it is in the libraries? I mean --

8 MS. SMITH: Yes.

9 DR. WAMPLER: -- you know, DDL you would have  
10 wide read files, or you would have the staff files --  
11 DOD --

12 MS. SMITH: No, the wide read files, the  
13 Presidential files are organized somewhat differently,  
14 because they really reflect the Office of the  
15 President.

16 DR. WAMPLER: That's what I mean. They're  
17 organized on those --

18 MS. SMITH: Most of what we're proposing are  
19 national security files that deal with countries --  
20 national security country file for VietNam at all three  
21 libraries, then the key national security staffers that  
22 dealt with those issues and Eastern Europe. So that's  
23 what we're proposing from those.

24 DR. WAMPLER: What would be most useful to  
25 you then, would --

1 MS. SMITH: Pardon?

2 DR. WAMPLER: What would be most useful to  
3 you is if we accept the chronological progression would  
4 be to see whether we want to endorse or play around  
5 with the priorities you set within each library for  
6 dealing with the files or records. That could be done  
7 pretty easily on the basis of what you have here, I  
8 would say.

9 MS. SMITH: It doesn't -- it's not very  
10 helpful for my review to say you're interested in DOD  
11 materials because they're all intermixed. But if the  
12 libraries you tell us you want materials dealing with  
13 the Mid-East war of '67, then we'll give you a search  
14 of where all that material is. The USS Liberty, we  
15 know where that material is. VietNam, we know where  
16 that material is, so the library files are somewhat  
17 more organized around subject, although we're pulling  
18 from different places.

19 DR. WAMPLER: All I'm saying is that it makes  
20 more sense to make recommendations based on the way in  
21 which the stuff is already organized, not try to pull --  
22 --

23 MS. SMITH: Right.

24 DR. WAMPLER: -- that apart and reassemble  
25 it.

1 MS. SMITH: Yes.

2 DR. WAMPLER: Yes.

3 PROF. TRACHTENBERG: Before we take these  
4 questions, I just have one specific follow-up. You  
5 said you wanted to avoid these competing  
6 declassification efforts at the Eisenhower library. I  
7 think one of our concerns should be, again, to get a  
8 sense of what these efforts are so that we can think in  
9 terms of a coordinated plan. Could you talk a little  
10 bit more about why, from the DOD, it's being done in  
11 that area, the Eisenhower library?

12 MS. SMITH: AT the Eisenhower library?

13 PROF. TRACHTENBERG: Yes.

14 MS. SMITH: It's specific -- Jeanne, maybe  
15 you can help me out here. The archivist that deals  
16 with mandatory review there felt that we had some  
17 record groups that were coming out that were fairly  
18 duplicative of some materials he has.

19 DR. GOLDBERG: Could you stand please?

20 MS. SCHAUBLE: The Eisenhower library has a  
21 microfilm of some of the records that we have in paper  
22 that deal with World War II. Most of the microfilm  
23 actually should be declassified except for individual  
24 items on each reel that have been withheld. So we have  
25 to then review those items that have been withheld to

1     see if they can now be declassified and released.  If  
2     we can release those items, they will be able to  
3     release the entire microfilm.  So it doesn't make a lot  
4     of sense to go out there and try to start from scratch  
5     and review the whole microfilm.

6             PROF. TRACHTENBERG:  This is the World War II  
7     stuff?

8             MS. SMITH:  Yes, but one thing you all may  
9     not realize is that presidential papers were the only  
10    papers that were exempt from the (inaudible) dealing  
11    with declassification of World War II materials.

12            PROF. TRACHTENBERG:  But nobody's working on  
13    a competing declassification effort on presidential  
14    materials in the Eisenhower library.  Right?  So if  
15    we -- so that whole argument for not focusing in on the  
16    presidential materials in the Eisenhower library  
17    because there's a competing declassification effort  
18    doesn't carry any weight.

19            MS. SMITH:  I guess we're not being clear.  
20    Jeanne has some stuff that has been declassified that  
21    we have microfilm out at the Eisenhower library.  We  
22    need to do the work to pare it out, to get that  
23    collection taken care of so that people aren't going  
24    out to the Eisenhower library and doing duplicative  
25    work that we can take care of.  And we have not -- NARA

1 has not done that work. We want to make sure that the  
2 agency that because it's declassified one place and it  
3 exists at another place that we're not having the few  
4 resources that there are, spend their time on a  
5 duplicative situation.

6 So I'm sorry if I'm not being clear. We  
7 could do Eisenhower library, but our priority was that  
8 it should go with the second year and we should address  
9 this one situation internally to the agency and not  
10 waste anybody's resources.

11 DR. GOLDBERG: Tony?

12 MR. PASSARELLA: OSD (inaudible) office --

13 DR. GOLDBERG: Would you stand please?

14 MR. PASSARELLA: I'm neither a records holder  
15 nor a historian.

16 DR. GOLDBERG: Your voice is not quite as  
17 good as Ms. Smith's.

18 MR. PASSARELLA: Okay. I just would like one  
19 clarification. All of these components are working  
20 very hard to make plans to declassify all the records  
21 that are 25 years old over the next five years. I  
22 still haven't heard what is the urgency to rearrange  
23 all these hard efforts that are going on. Why is it --  
24 I mean we're talking about 25 year old records. Why is  
25 it that we have to rush some when everyone has to have

1       them finished by five years? I mean is there a valid  
2       reason for the urgency?

3               DR. GOLDBERG: Yes. It's a question of what  
4       will happen to the exempted records which contain, I  
5       think, most of the material that people here are  
6       interested in.

7               MR. PASSARELLA: As I read the Executive  
8       Order and your employing a systematic review apply.

9               DR. GOLDBERG: Yes, but the question is when  
10      will they get around to a systematic review of the  
11      exempted records at the higher levels?

12              MR. PASSARELLA: Well I guess my question --

13              DR. GOLDBERG: Without -- without some kind -  
14      -

15              MR. PASSARELLA: -- here (inaudible)--  
16      automatic declassification, you're still going to have  
17      to review the records, and you've got all these people  
18      working damn hard to do the requirements of the  
19      Executive Order for the next five years, and now we're  
20      going to force down their throat -- when they're going  
21      to have to review them anyhow over five years -- in a  
22      different direction. That's what I guess I don't  
23      understand.

24              MS. SMITH: Well, there is one requirement  
25      under the Executive Order that the archivists in the

1 United States declassify 15 -- some percentage of the  
2 papers of the former presidents in the first year. So,  
3 what NARA is asking is how are we going to declassify  
4 that? We did not pick 15 percent. We picked a small  
5 sample -- sort of a pilot project to see if it would  
6 work. So that's the one requirement.

7 MR. PASSARELLA: Well, I'm not worried  
8 about -- I'm wondering from the historian's standpoint  
9 what their urgency is on certain areas?

10 PROF. TRACHTENBERG: I can answer that by  
11 actual -- giving you a specific reference, because the  
12 answer is there's certain skepticism about whether this  
13 project of total review in five years is going to be  
14 successful. Alright? An example is the plan for the  
15 Defense Nuclear Agency. It says in their section on  
16 compliance methodology, that they propose to review 20  
17 cubic feet per month for the next four and a half  
18 years. You do the arithmetic, that gives you 1080  
19 cubic feet.

20 It turns out that the material that they're  
21 going to have to review adds up to 12,900 cubic feet.  
22 So -- so the realities of the limited budget are such  
23 that there is no way, in spite of what they say, that  
24 in this period they're going to be going through 100  
25 percent of their material.

1 MR. PASSARELLA: I'm not representing anyone  
2 here.

3 PROF. TRACHTENBERG: I'm just saying -- I'm  
4 saying on the basis of information that we were given,  
5 there is certain grounds for skepticism, alright? And  
6 it's simply a budgetary reality.

7 MR. PASSARELLA: That's my point --

8 PROF. TRACHTENBERG: So given that, this  
9 budgetary reality, that means that it makes sense to  
10 talk about priorities. Let's not waste time on junk  
11 when we could be focusing on real things. Let's be  
12 realistic about this whole problem. That's the answer  
13 to your question.

14 MR. PASSARELLA: Okay.

15 DR. GOLDBERG: Not only that but most of the  
16 plans call for 75 percent within five years, at least  
17 not -- which leaves 25 percent, which could very well  
18 be the kinds of things that people here are most  
19 interested in. This is another reason for the  
20 priorities. Yes.

21 MR. NORRIS: Robert Norris again. Just a  
22 quick point of information about how would this get  
23 implemented? Who would give the order to set you -- or  
24 upon recommendation perhaps of the panel here to make  
25 this the pilot project. What are the mechanics for

1 ordering you to attack those particular files?

2 MS. SMITH: Well, NARA's problem is -- for  
3 the whole of the National Archives, we have very little  
4 original declassification so any in this material will  
5 have to get, because of the multiple equities, will  
6 have to get reviewed by the different agencies, so if  
7 this group endorses the plan and perhaps gets involved  
8 with the CIA optical scanning plan, someone will be  
9 reviewing the materials and getting the archives back  
10 the declassification authority, so we can coordinate  
11 those and get those available to the public.

12 But without people doing -- attacking the  
13 libraries in some sort of systematic way, all that  
14 we're faced with is sending in our individual mandatory  
15 review requests which we've been doing for years and  
16 years and years, but it is not going to address the  
17 Executive Order.

18 DR. GOLDBERG: Ernest?

19 PROF. MAY: I wanted to ask -- first off,  
20 make a proposal which is, that we ask Ms. Smith to  
21 provide this plan to this panel and to the extent that  
22 she can do it, to give us some hint as to what works,  
23 some alternatives to be thought about, other categories  
24 and things that you might have considered --

25 MS. SMITH: Oh, well -- I think in this other

1 group they were asking if we could do one library.

2 Yes, we can do one library; we can -- someone on this  
3 group asked can we do one older library. Yes, because  
4 if it's an older library we can up the figures that say  
5 the library that had the most of what we were  
6 proposing, which was Johnson, and try and get more like  
7 200,000 classified items there. We can go two  
8 libraries. All we need is the input as to where you  
9 want to go. What we were trying to do was do it where  
10 we felt we were the most ready. But we are more than  
11 going to try to shift. I mean --

12 PROF. MAY: I just thought it would be useful  
13 to us if we could look at some alternative conditions  
14 that if you thought --

15 MS. SMITH: Well, you can do middle Eastern  
16 policy; you can do national security files; or you can  
17 do a whole collection, like all of the Eisenhower or  
18 Truman libraries' classified materials.

19 PROF. MAY: The second part, I have a  
20 question for you. You said that it's expensive to  
21 review many of these classified documents. How  
22 expensive?

23 MS. SMITH: It's extremely expensive because  
24 we have classified storage facilities at each  
25 presidential library, and I can give the figures that

1 we gave to Moynihan's Commission -- see, I don't have  
2 them with me, but we have to maintain them there. When  
3 we ship them back for review, if they are at certain  
4 level -- Top Secret -- or they contain departmental  
5 information, they have to go a set way. Often that  
6 involves a trip of 90 miles, one way, to get it there.  
7 So there's a huge amount of cost in the mandatory  
8 review program is extremely costly, both from National  
9 Archives standpoint and the agency's standpoint,  
10 because you're dealing with one document, transporting  
11 it back and forth and getting multiple agencies to look  
12 at our stuff, because most of our stuff will have more  
13 than one equity in it. So it's very expensive.

14 Now we too have extremely limited resources,  
15 and that was one reason why we tried to do something  
16 that we feel we might be able to handle.

17 PROF. MAY: Did you write some thing about  
18 this for the Moynihan Commission?

19 MS. SMITH: The archivist made a presentation  
20 to the Moynihan Commission with some recommendations.  
21 And certainly I can get a copy of that. I don't know  
22 if it's specifically went into the storage costs at the  
23 presidential libraries. I don't -- it didn't. Yes.  
24 But certainly, you know, we would have to work those  
25 figures up. Storage of classified materials for all of

1 the National Archives is extremely costly. The thing  
2 is it's costly through the whole federal records. It's  
3 not just the National Archives.

4 DR. WAMPLER: Are you going off with a  
5 recommendation to review or a recommendation to  
6 release?

7 MS. SMITH: I'm sorry.

8 DR. WAMPLER: Are you going off with a  
9 recommendation to review or a recommendation to  
10 release? Are you making a positive assertion in your  
11 work plan that you think these are records that not  
12 only should be reviewed, but should be released. I  
13 mean --

14 MS. SMITH: That should be released, yes.

15 DR. WAMPLER: -- did you make that kind of  
16 assessment?

17 MS. SMITH: We are saying that in the  
18 presidential libraries, some of you are aware, they're  
19 donated historical materials. There's a donor gift  
20 provision. What I'm saying is that these are records  
21 that have been screened for that release, and if  
22 they're declassified, once we can do the coordination  
23 of the library, and there will be a time lag, the  
24 majority of these materials will be released. They  
25 will not be withheld for a donor deed of gift reason.

1 They've already been screened for that.

2 DR. WAMPLER: And if you come up with a non-  
3 concurrence, does it then get booted up to the higher  
4 interagency panel which has been established on the  
5 Executive Order?

6 DR. GOLDBERG: I presume appeals can be made,  
7 yes.

8 DR. WAMPLER: But -- you can -- you can  
9 bargain. You can try to negotiate on this if an agency  
10 says no, you can go back to them and can the panel help  
11 you in that regard?

12 MS. SMITH: Yes, and as I said, the CIA plan  
13 is still in the talking stage, and it's not clear to me  
14 if it's like a CIA letterhead document or they feel  
15 it's their equity. They may do that too. This is the  
16 part of the plan that is unclear to me as to how much  
17 coordination NARA will be doing and what they will be  
18 doing.

19 DR. GOLDBERG: Ernest, did you have anything  
20 further?

21 PROF. MAY: No, thank you.

22 DR. GOLDBERG: Let me remind you that the  
23 Moynihan Commission is the commission of protecting,  
24 reducing government security established by statute and  
25 has a two year life after its first meeting.

1                   Lunch has been brought in and I suggest that  
2       we stop at this time for perhaps 45 minutes to an hour  
3       for lunch and then resume.

4                   (Whereupon, at 11:40 a.m., the meeting was  
5       recessed, to reconvene at 12:45 p.m., this same day,  
6       Friday, February 23, 1996.)

A F T E R N O O N   S E S S I O N

12:45

p.m.

DR. GOLDBERG: Earlier this morning I mentioned some areas of records that -- from which access is excluded by statute. One of those areas is prisoner of war -- some prisoner of war records. We have with us today a gentleman who is engaged in doing research in prisoner of war records who would like to make a few remarks on this subject. Mr. Hall.

MR. HALL: Thank you Dr. Goldberg. I am an independent POW-MIA researcher. I do research for a number of families, a number of missing relatives that were very possibly captured and not returned. The intelligence records that I'm speaking about are those such as the 500 (inaudible) records that were first said to have been destroyed, now find that they have been held at Arlington Hall and transported to INSCOM (ph), but INSCOM can't locate them.

The same is true of the Air Force 7602nd records that were previously held at Kelly Air Force Base. They disappeared too.

Now these are two organizational records that appropriately disappeared from any record group. And I found some 500 MI group records out in the National

1       Record Center, but they don't -- they aren't the war  
2       time records. They contain POW information and me  
3       seeking a lot of the records through the FOIA, the DPMO  
4       (ph) and OASD cannot identify these records as  
5       existing. They have identified some customer copies at  
6       the Library of Congress, but these don't come from the  
7       original records section.

8               These are probably just an indication of  
9       other records that may be missing too. There are a  
10      group of records called the SAA (ph) daily summaries  
11      that disappeared. They were known to exist. They  
12      can't be FOIA'd; they can't be found; they can't be  
13      located.

14             So if you're going to pursue research for  
15      recent declassification of records, you can't exclude  
16      those records that the DOD components haven't properly  
17      identified and I believe you have to inquire the  
18      components to seek these out, because if nobody's  
19      concerned about an intelligence records group for a ten  
20      year period of time, and these are still classified  
21      secret and above, there's really an issue of -- I'm  
22      really concerned about intelligence records, first of  
23      all, and what happens to the POW records when they  
24      pertain to possibly living persons. The fact that they  
25      are alive now doesn't matter because the records were

1 missing this year.

2           So I believe this has to be addressed before  
3 you can really continue any further in considering all  
4 the records that are now becoming declassified, you  
5 can't continue without considering those records that  
6 should exist and haven't been destroyed -- there's no  
7 record of destruction; they just can't be found. And  
8 intelligence records, I consider, as somewhat  
9 important, and I hope you do something to have DOD do a  
10 more serious search for these records.

11           DR. GOLDBERG: Thank you. This is not the  
12 first instance in which records have turned up missing,  
13 and there are other -- have been other occasions when  
14 other records -- although I don't know of any on this  
15 scale -- in the past -- this large number -- a whole  
16 record group or a large portion of a record group  
17 missing.

18           I'd like to lend some more focus to this  
19 discussion and point out that one of the things that  
20 should come out of this meeting is the report on the  
21 meeting and whatever conclusions or recommendations or  
22 suggestions we have to make to higher authority.

23           And I'd like us to address our remarks then  
24 to what is it that we should include in this -- what  
25 are we prepared to include in a report at this time?

1 As a result of this meeting? What do we have to tell  
2 the Assistant Secretary for C3I, who presumably will  
3 then pass this report on up the line and also,  
4 presumably, out to other agencies of the Department of  
5 Defense? What are the things that you believe ought to  
6 be included in this report?

7 Now, perhaps one thing we might discuss  
8 initially and certainly within our purview is our  
9 reaction to the declassification plans as a beginning  
10 point. Do we want to say anything about some people  
11 are obviously dissatisfied with these plans, that they  
12 are not adequate, they don't answer the mail. What can  
13 and should we say on this subject, if anything?

14 PROF. LEFFLER: Oh, I think one of the things  
15 we should express is our concern that efforts are being  
16 primarily directed at achieving a 15 percent goal,  
17 rather than identifying and declassifying records that  
18 are generally regarded as highly important. And I  
19 would like to see some directive handed down that would  
20 instruct the agencies to focus some attention on the  
21 declassification of high level materials.

22 I also think that it would be desirable to --  
23 to emphasize the need for the Secretary of Defense or  
24 somebody to allocate some additional resources to help  
25 implement the declassification of what articles -- what

1 we've heard here is that there's really no prospect of  
2 this being realistically implemented unless some  
3 resources are earmarked specifically for this purpose.

4 DR. GOLDBERG: Alright. That's a good start.  
5 Elliot.

6 PROF. COHEN: It just strikes me, looking  
7 at -- browsing through these -- some of them are not  
8 really plans at all, and some clearly have been more  
9 effort to get somebody else off their backs -- and I  
10 think it would be worthwhile to call attention to that  
11 fact, or to the kind of problems Mark identified,  
12 where, even if you do the arithmetic, people can't  
13 possibly achieve their goals.

14 And the problem I have with the 15 percent is  
15 that it's clear they're not going to get to 15 percent,  
16 and I think to the extent that we can force people to  
17 fact that and maybe light a fire under some of the --  
18 or at least make uncomfortable some of the people who  
19 are drafting plans which are perfunctory, that would be  
20 a useful thing to do.

21 DR. GOLDBERG: They may get to 15 percent, it  
22 may not be the 15 percent you would like to see, but it  
23 is possible --

24 PROF. COHEN: Well, I mean if it really -- if  
25 they really do 15 percent a year for however long it

1 takes --

2 DR. GOLDBERG: The first year anyhow.

3 OBSERVER: The first year.

4 PROF. COHEN: Well, but I mean if they should  
5 be that successful --

6 DR. GOLDBERG: Jim Davis.

7 MR. DAVIS: Again, I'm concerned about what  
8 they can -- what the records are that (inaudible)  
9 declassification and how many resources are being  
10 devoted to automatic declassification effort? And in  
11 that regard, I would like some discussion or proposals  
12 simply to automatically declassify confidential records  
13 that include confidential history, thereby achieving  
14 these goals over the next five years with little or no  
15 declassification review effort.

16 DR. GOLDBERG: Reaction to that? Yes.

17 MR. S. GOLDBERG: Well, there is a problem  
18 with that. There's two kinds of confidential material.  
19 One kind is the stuff that was classified confidential  
20 when it was originated and that stuff is pretty much  
21 low risk stuff, maybe a candidate for bulk  
22 declassifying. But the other kind of confidential  
23 material is stuff that under the original group marking  
24 system was group 3, and downrated in 12 year intervals  
25 from top secret and is laying there in confidential

1 now. And there's very important stuff in there and  
2 that is probably not a candidate for bulk  
3 declassification by anybody. That's probably higher  
4 level stuff. You shouldn't assume it's going to be  
5 bulk

6 DR. GOLDBERG: Well, it's downgraded in  
7 intervals with -- couldn't it be declassified after  
8 that?

9 MR. S. GOLDBERG: No, that's group 4. Group  
10 4 was automatically -- the next category is group 3,  
11 not automatically declassified, which means, at the end  
12 of at least 36 years or so, it needs to be looked at.  
13 It's not automatically. So you can't assume that  
14 everything that's confidential is junk.

15 MR. BROWN: The bulk of naval propulsion  
16 information -- you may remember that the bulk of the  
17 information --

18 DR. GOLDBERG: Beg your pardon?

19 MR. BROWN: The bulk of naval nuclear  
20 propulsion information is at (inaudible). Not subject  
21 to declassification.

22 MR. DAVIS: What I'm talking about is --

23 DR. GOLDBERG: It's exempted?

24 MR. BROWN: Yes.

25 MR. DAVIS: -- you're throwing out, for

1       example, the National Archives, utilizing the finding  
2       aids, if necessary a 135 as the keys of the archivist,  
3       identifying confidential entries in various record  
4       groups, and at the same time going out to the records  
5       center and reviewing the 135s and identifying  
6       confidential accessions. And then with respect to  
7       official histories, identifying those that are  
8       classified as confidential. Simply automatically  
9       declassifying them, and -- and I don't say for example,  
10      in the records center you're going to find an accession  
11      that's classified as confidential that is the result of  
12      downgrading over the years. You might, you might not.  
13      But I think it would be a simple task to determine that  
14      versus going through whatever the records are that are  
15      currently in category 3 and what I imagine use an  
16      enormous number of resources required to do that sort  
17      of thing. This would simply free up the very limited  
18      resources available for the declassification review to  
19      focus in on records of greater interest.

20               DR. GOLDBERG: Ms. Schauble.

21               MS. SCHAUBLE: That is kind of what we're  
22      doing right now in this year. The problem with that is  
23      that even in confidential files we are finding a lot of  
24      restricted data. You can't just say that because it's  
25      confidential you can let it go without looking at it.

1 I wish you could.

2 DR. GOLDBERG: Colonel.

3 COL. PONNWITZ: One comment on these plans --  
4 I think we're going to have to be very careful if  
5 you're going to go back to the agency that originated  
6 it, to teak (ph) their plan without asking them  
7 specific questions regarding each plan that you're  
8 having difficulty with. Quantification of these  
9 numbers real or no, from the very offset, are based on  
10 estimates of the volume of material that's out there.  
11 We don't even have a number in DOD that's anywhere  
12 close to what we think the requirement is going to be.

13 As we go through our plans we will develop a  
14 better feel for the quantity of materials that are out  
15 there. So if it's quantity and numbers that we're hung  
16 up on, I don't think that now is the appropriate time  
17 to say that that's not right. If it's process and  
18 procedures, yes, let's critique that and say hey, you  
19 really haven't told us in the sense -- but I think it  
20 would -- should go plan by plan by plan, not just a  
21 generality to the superiors that says, hey, all these  
22 plans are no good, because there's not enough of an  
23 understanding of what is in these plans. There was no  
24 guidance given as to how these plans should be  
25 organized or what they should say in them. It was just

1 here's the Executive Order, tell us how you're going to  
2 implement it and how are you going to meet these  
3 targets. And I think that's what was attempted in each  
4 of these documents.

5 DR. GOLDBERG: Alright, this -- yes, Bob.

6 DR. WAMPLER: One item that's already been  
7 kicked around is endorsing or in some way commenting  
8 upon the Presidential declassification plan. It seems  
9 like everyone was agreed that this is one good first  
10 cut as a possible test case for working through this.

11 DR. GOLDBERG: The Presidential Libraries?

12 DR. WAMPLER: The Presidential Libraries,  
13 yes.

14 DR. GOLDBERG: We've all agree on that.

15 DR. WAMPLER: From talking, during the lunch,  
16 I get the sense that there is a certain consensus  
17 perhaps among the historians that a lot of high level  
18 material they are very interested in are these record  
19 group 330, and that moving into them is going to have  
20 an impact on everybody else in this room, because of  
21 all the coordination problems involved.

22 DR. GOLDBERG: Eventually.

23 DR. WAMPLER: Eventually -- well, but I mean  
24 in some way, whereas within each service there may be  
25 relatively much less high level policy information of

1 the type that we initially are interested in.  
2 So the question is as a body, should we focus first  
3 upon trying to develop priorities within record group  
4 330, as that's in a way the most encompassing record  
5 group, one which creates the most coordination  
6 problems, and the one in which perhaps as a test case  
7 we would get a very good sense immediately in terms of  
8 feedback say, from the relevant agencies, and from  
9 Frank in his office, of what are the real concrete  
10 problems involved? If we say we would like to have  
11 these -- say the list I put in, that list  
12 chronologically, would be our first cut as an idea of  
13 what a good sense of priorities would be. What does  
14 this do to you, and try to get down to specifics to  
15 deal with that. This is a learning curve, that's back  
16 to this.

17 DR. GOLDBERG: Okay, I'd like to hold that to  
18 a little bit later -- I'd like to get to that, that's  
19 important, perhaps the core of what we're talking  
20 about, reporting on, but I'd like to go through the  
21 other items that we really should consider for a  
22 possible report. And I'd like to dispose of them if  
23 possible -- but what order.

24 So I still would like to get a sense of what  
25 we ought to say with reference to the declassification

1 plans. I do think we ought to be careful in what we do  
2 say, obviously. A certain amount of effort was put  
3 into them, by the people who made the reports. They  
4 may not be all that they ought to be and we might  
5 undoubtedly want more, and this is what leads to, I  
6 think, the second point here, this need for more  
7 information which most of us, I think, have expressed  
8 at some time or other. That we want to know to a  
9 greater extent than we already know, what is there --  
10 it's somewhere. We're not going to get any great  
11 detail, not in any reasonable period of time, but we  
12 can get a better notion of the essence of what is there  
13 and this could help us, I think, in determining  
14 priorities eventually.

15 So I think perhaps we ought to consider these  
16 things together -- we're talking about the  
17 declassification plans and the need for more  
18 information. Yes.

19 BG. ARMSTRONG: Let me suggest that it seems  
20 to me that what the academic historical community are  
21 primarily interested in are papers in Presidential  
22 Libraries, OSD papers as they pertain to the Secretary  
23 of Defense's and his principal assistants, policy-  
24 making activities, and those Joint Staff -- JCS papers  
25 that have a similar focus.

1           It would seem -- first of all, I'm very  
2   uncomfortable with signing up to any criticism of  
3   anybody's declassification plan until the person who  
4   wrote that plan or who owns it comes and explains it.  
5   That's not -- speaking as a bureaucrat, I just don't do  
6   those things.

7           So I would think that it would be reasonable  
8   for this body to request that the people responsible  
9   for implementing the declassification plans for OSD  
10  papers, and the Joint Staff papers, come in next time  
11  and brief those plans as they -- as they exist, as  
12  they're implementing them. And to the degree that they  
13  can, be prepared to answer more detailed questions from  
14  particularly, the academic historians as to how -- if  
15  not the details of what are in the archives that  
16  they're talking about, at least the kinds of  
17  descriptive materials that would be available to the  
18  historian who had particular interests in those  
19  archives to pursue.

20           Once again -- I -- really -- I understand the  
21  academic historians concern, but I really am  
22  uncomfortable with an approach -- Professor Leffler, I  
23  think, has best characterized this approach that  
24  basically goes back to the archivist and says, sort of  
25  tell us in these important areas what you have. I

1 think if the historical profession really wants to  
2 know, then they're going to have to do part of the  
3 work, and that work is going to be involved -- and I  
4 think they have a right to expect the archivist to come  
5 and explain his collection as best he can, and how to  
6 get further information. But then if you want to get  
7 information to the degree that Bob Wampler has put it  
8 out here on the table, that involves some work by  
9 historians.

10 And that's just sort of my view of the way  
11 the world works. And I think it's sort of the official  
12 historian point of view of the way the world works. I  
13 hesitate to speak for my colleagues, but I think that's  
14 right.

15 DR. GOLDBERG: Well, I find that all the  
16 things that I've jotted down, talked about, form a  
17 seamless fabric here -- all related to each other  
18 because the next point I had was the need for liaison  
19 with the archivist, the declassifiers. It's going to  
20 help a great deal to know them and for them to know us  
21 when we want what they have and what they can do, and  
22 having perhaps come in and give a briefing to this  
23 panel would serve to establish a relationship which  
24 might be more difficult to get otherwise. How does  
25 that strike you?

1                   PROF. TRACHTENBERG: Perfect.

2                   DR. GOLDBERG: I like that. Any other  
3 reactions to that? From the panel? Yes.

4                   MR. DAVIS: When you speak of archivists  
5 (inaudible), are you thinking of the archivists focus  
6 in on the records, still physically in their custody in  
7 the other DOD components? Again, with considerable  
8 effort, depending on the size of the records, you can  
9 get a fairly good idea of what the National Archives  
10 holds, much -- generally a much more detailed idea of  
11 what's at the record center or record centers.

12                   With respect to collections in the physical  
13 custody of DOD components, for the most part, the  
14 public has no information.

15                   DR. GOLDBERG: Do you have any notion how  
16 extensive those are for the period prior to 1970?

17                   MR. DAVIS: No, I don't. No I don't but --  
18 for example, in the Army declassification plan under  
19 the Army Intelligence and Security Command, holdings of  
20 approximately 7,000 feet are listed at some repository  
21 in Virginia, and no further information is given on the  
22 dates of those records, classification status, types of  
23 records. Are they all paper clipped -- no, obviously  
24 not. What kind of records are there?

25                   DR. GOLDBERG: Well, we're going to have to

1 take this step by step, aren't we?

2 MR. DAVIS: It's just -- I mean that -- for  
3 example, the repository, the public can't visit them --  
4 I'm not talking about reviewing the records, but simply  
5 going out there and talking with a records manager --  
6 something along those lines.

7 DR. GOLDBERG: Yes, I think we're going to  
8 have to start with the very large bodies which are  
9 already in the National Archives and in the federal  
10 records center, because I think that's the bulk of it  
11 all. If you're correct, there are some collections  
12 which are still held by agencies of DOD, most of them I  
13 would guess, are highly exempted records, and that's  
14 why they're being held, and it would take a lot of  
15 time, a lot of effort to get anything on them. I think  
16 it's some thing we should keep in mind and eventually  
17 get around to, but initially, I think we'll have our  
18 hands full if we deal with what's in our National  
19 Archives and record centers.

20 MR. DAVIS: For example, to inquire of what  
21 Office of the Secretary of Defense record before 1970,  
22 are still physically in the custody of OSD, where would  
23 somebody go?

24 DR. GOLDBERG: I don't think --

25 PROF. TRACHTENBERG: This is precisely the

1 sort of issue that we would want to talk with whoever  
2 is in charge of the OSD declassification effort. This  
3 is not anything we have to bring up in our report, but  
4 we simply want to talk with people in an unadversarial  
5 way about what their thinking is about how they're  
6 tackling the problem and -- and the issues that you  
7 raise will be brought up at that time.

8 DR. GOLDBERG: Yes.

9 DR. DUDLEY: I would hesitate to accept the  
10 statement that seems to indict all the plans that are  
11 offered here as being inadequate, as Professor Cohen  
12 did.

13 PROF. COHEN: Excuse me, that's not what I  
14 said. I said some of these are perfunctory.

15 DR. DUDLEY: Well, then --

16 PROF. COHEN: I said some of them are very  
17 clearly not perfunctory.

18 DR. DUDLEY: Well, good, would you be willing  
19 to name the plans you consider to be perfunctory?

20 PROF. COHEN: I looked at this -- that  
21 paper -- but I'm sorry if I was misunderstood. I would  
22 be in favor of asking people from those organizations  
23 to come and talk to us about what they're planning on  
24 doing. We should ask them questions and I agree with  
25 Mr. Trachtenberg's -- a cordial conversation. Btu some

1 of them really just don't tell you anything except that  
2 we're going to declassify 20 percent a year, and that's  
3 highly implausible.

4 DR. DUDLEY: Okay, well, I just think if you  
5 have a list of things you consider to be perfunctory or  
6 inadequate, that should be passed to Mr. Goldberg.  
7 Then people can respond to it. Otherwise, you're going  
8 to have everybody come in here and explain their plan.  
9 Now, if that's what you want, if that's what everybody  
10 wants, fine. But I mean -- you simply made an  
11 allegation.

12 PROF. COHEN: I'm sorry if I was unclear but  
13 I believe you misunderstood me.

14 DR. GOLDBERG: Well, I don't think there is  
15 any necessity for us to pass judgement in a report of  
16 these plans. We may want to make some general remarks,  
17 and in particular we may want to say we would like to  
18 know more from some plans, or perhaps all of the plans,  
19 and we would like to establish some kind of  
20 relationship with these people, have them come before  
21 us, visit us, tell us what's there and find out how  
22 they can help us and what we would like to ask of them.  
23 I think that's reasonable in a report of this kind.  
24 I'm not looking to make criticism of individual plans.

25 DR. WAMPLER: Oh, yes, in terms of request

1 for information, if you're going to assume that these  
2 15 or 20 percent tranches (ph) include not only  
3 category 3, but two and one, you want to know how  
4 they're planning on doing it over the next five years.  
5 You may find some things that we say we don't want to  
6 mess with this. You're getting to some of the things  
7 you want to look at perhaps in this material, but we  
8 want to get behind the numbers as Mel and Mark and  
9 others say, to find out, okay, what are you really  
10 planning on looking at in each year as part of an  
11 effort to get to this level of attainment within the  
12 plan.

13 DR. GOLDBERG: You should --

14 DR. WAMPLER: That's the sort of information  
15 we're talking about.

16 DR. GOLDBERG: You should feel at liberty to  
17 ask that. It's perfectly all right, although don't  
18 tell them there's some things you don't want them to  
19 mess with. You won't get a good reaction to that.  
20 Tony?

21 MR. PASSARELLA: From what I'm hearing from  
22 everybody here, I think from everybody here, I think  
23 one of the most important things that you can put  
24 forward in your report here, evaluation scheme, is  
25 concern that enough resources have been allocated to

1       executing these plans. These can be wonderful plans,  
2       but if you don't have anybody to do it, then it's a  
3       waste of time.

4               I think that's probably one of the biggest  
5       keys to be successful in this declassification project,  
6       is having the people and the resources to do it.

7               DR. GOLDBERG: It seems to me we have heard  
8       that theme somewhere before.

9               MR. PASSARELLA: It's probably the only major  
10       issue at this point.

11              DR. GOLDBERG: That's been brought home, I  
12       think, by others also. Yes.

13              OBSERVER: If I may just remark on one thing  
14       that Professor Leffler said and Professor Cohen added  
15       to it -- the first remarks out of the chute here this  
16       afternoon -- those comments, suggestions,  
17       recommendations, are addressed to the President of the  
18       United States. Nobody else can change what you suggest  
19       be changed.

20              DR. GOLDBERG: I'm just afraid I don't  
21       understand what you're --

22              OBSERVER: The problem is you can't change  
23       the 15 percent because that's in the Executive Order.

24              DR. GOLDBERG: We're not proposing to change  
25       it.

1                   OBSERVER: But that's what his recommendation  
2 is.

3                   PROF. LEFFLER: No, no. My concern is that --  
4 that we try to declassify some of the important  
5 materials amongst that 15 percent, and that I think we  
6 should explicitly express our feelings on this  
7 committee that if we proceed or things proceed as they  
8 seem to be proceeding that high level material will not  
9 be declassified.

10                  BG. ARMSTRONG: That's your conclusion. I  
11 don't think that conclusion -- I don't share that  
12 conclusion.

13                  PROF. LEFFLER: Well, that's -- we can  
14 discuss whether the bulk of this committee shares that  
15 concern. I personally feel that.

16                  COL. PONNWITZ: Right now we're doing an  
17 organized random declassification -- that's what I  
18 would call it. We have to abide by that 15 percent and  
19 we start -- we ask our archivist, you know, how are you  
20 going to do it? And they suggest they proceed in a  
21 certain way to get to the 15 percent. Obviously OSD's  
22 15 percent will include more high level information  
23 than our 15 percent will.

24                  The problem is -- and the difficulty is when  
25 you start trying to put that in a non-random order, in

1 a specific order, if you're not willing to dedicate the  
2 resources that can alleviate the time it's going to take  
3 or interruption to the process we've already  
4 established, we're going to spend a lot of time talking  
5 about it, but we're still going to have to continue on  
6 meeting the requirements of the Executive Order.

7 So somehow we have to decide if there is a  
8 need to focus our efforts in a certain way, if we can  
9 do it in the least disruptive manner possible -- you  
10 can get with the archivist and tell them if you can do  
11 this, do it in this order. If we can't do that, or  
12 they come back and say I can't, this is the way I have  
13 to do it, and you're not willing to put resources in to  
14 give them aid in their efforts, then you're going to  
15 have to be satisfied with their plans and the way  
16 they're going to proceed.

17 Because as we found out with the Persian Gulf  
18 War declassification effort, until considerable  
19 resources were dedicated to that effort, to fulfill the  
20 way DOD wanted to do it, none of us could comply with  
21 the sense of urgency that it had.

22 And that's the same case here. We will  
23 comply with our 15 percent, but if they're not  
24 satisfied with the way we're going to do it, then find  
25 a way to give us resources to change our approach.

1 DR. GOLDBERG: What will be the penalty if  
2 you don't achieve 15 percent?

3 COL. PONNWITZ: Well, there are no counting  
4 placement. If I tell you I have 4,000,000 records, I  
5 could have 10,000,000 records. You don't know that.  
6 If I tell you at the end of this year that I've  
7 achieved my 15 percent, you're not going to know that.  
8 Nobody is. And that's -- you know, the only time  
9 you're going to know that is at the end of the process  
10 if there's a lot of records still in a pile and  
11 everybody's saying hey, we met the requirement -- and I  
12 don't know if that's going to happen or not.

13 DR. GOLDBERG: Well, the question is if that  
14 happens, what is the consequences? I understand in the  
15 Executive Order you review or release but isn't there  
16 another option, like to totally exempt this review  
17 process for the records that are left over by the year  
18 2000? I mean that's your out that people worry about  
19 as well. And then the services are going to have  
20 policy materials that are going to end up buried,  
21 backlogged with a lot of high sensitive material --  
22 need to say, okay, we can't do it and there's a  
23 loophole in the Executive Order which lets us take it  
24 off the table. It may (inaudible), but it's an out in  
25 the Executive Order.

1                   MR. HALL: In considering these 15 percent  
2                   that you've declassified, any POW records were ordered  
3                   declassified under the existing Executive Order  
4                   12810DDM (ph) so any records, groups found, or  
5                   organizational records found that are POW records would  
6                   have to be put into this priority. The deadline of  
7                   November 1993 has been reached and the records haven't  
8                   been declassified; they still fall under the urgency of  
9                   that deadline. So if you resume your classification, I  
10                  request that these records be considered in that first  
11                  15 percent as soon as they're located.

12                 DR. GOLDBERG: So much for deadlines. We all  
13                 know that a lot of these orders are much more observed  
14                 in breach. Just because it's an Executive Order or a  
15                 law does not mean that all the provisions are actually  
16                 carried out on time. They may over time, but most  
17                 programs fall behind, and I suspect that there's a fair  
18                 chance that this one's going to fall behind too. Not  
19                 the first year, perhaps later on. It's a very  
20                 difficult undertaking -- an enormous undertaking, and  
21                 if it does fall behind, I for one, will not be  
22                 surprised. At the end of five years a very large  
23                 quantity of classified documents have not been reviewed  
24                 -- as I say, I will not be surprised.

25                 On the other hand, I would hope that they

1 would not be the documents that we would like to see  
2 declassified. We don't know. It's going to be a mixed  
3 bag. It's going to vary from service to service,  
4 organization to organization. They all have their own  
5 priorities, their own limited resources and we have to  
6 expect a very varied result. Yes.

7 DR. WAMPLER: In terms of the recommendation  
8 on the resource issue, other than a pious exhortation  
9 to make more money available, what would the services  
10 and agencies like to see come out of here in terms of a  
11 recommendation for something that would come out of  
12 Perry's office, say? Is there anything that he could,  
13 if he could be persuaded, that would unleash resources  
14 that we could recommend?

15 DR. GOLDBERG: Well is that the \$64,000  
16 question?

17 DR. WAMPLER: Yes, what can we do in essence,  
18 to make a recommendation --

19 DR. GOLDBERG: Okay, what are some specifics?  
20 Let's recommend one thing that was discussed at lunch  
21 time as a possibility of using reserve officers and  
22 become active duty and help. This has been done before  
23 for a variety of purposes. These are not just --  
24 various periods of time; they would have to get up to  
25 speed; they would have to learn what it was all about

1       so that -- to have them come in for two week periods  
2       would not help very much. They would probably have to  
3       come in for at least six months or more at a stretch.  
4       But that's a possibility and I see no reason why we  
5       shouldn't make that kind of suggestion. Here is one  
6       way, perhaps, of stretching the resources. Now are  
7       there others?

8               COL. PONNWITZ: Sir, it's beyond just  
9       bringing more people on active duty. If we look at the  
10      model that's been done for the Persian Gulf War  
11      declassification, you have an executive agent assigned,  
12      you have a facility that was developed, you had  
13      resources, computers and people and reserve officers.  
14      So depending on the magnitude of the problem and the  
15      way you want to handle it, it almost requires --  
16      particularly for the OSD records and the records that  
17      are of the highest policy -- that's where you need the  
18      augmentation of personnel and equipment and a facility  
19      dedicated to this process, and civilian personnel hired  
20      too who are experts in this, to help you through that  
21      queue faster.

22             For the rest of us, I don't know that we can  
23      come up and say that we need X, Y, and Z and that you  
24      would process it for us because we pretty much have our  
25      plans established. I think we can meet them. But the

1 higher levels I think is where you need to focus the  
2 resources.

3 DR. GOLDBERG: Well, Marines may be able to  
4 do it, but I don't doubt that the other services would  
5 be very glad to have some further assistance. Am I  
6 correct? I think the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force  
7 too for that matter. Yes?

8 MR. GRABOSKE: Well, in answer to Bob  
9 Wampler's comment let me suggest that Secretary Perry  
10 be asked to provide resources equivalent to what had  
11 been provided to the Gulf War declassification effort  
12 this year, which is roughly, I think, \$10,000,000 --  
13 just this year. This is a much bigger program and  
14 many, many more agencies involved.

15 DR. WAMPLER: Well, would you want to clarify  
16 in some way right back to this program and say if  
17 you're going to do this program on a scale equivalent  
18 to what was provided to the Gulf War, it would come out  
19 to this figure and then try to shoot for something --

20 MR. GRABOSKE: Well, I never --

21 DR. WAMPLER: If it's reasonable.

22 MR. GRABOSKE: (inaudible) let's just say  
23 equivalent to Gulf War declassification which is  
24 \$10,000,000 more than we have now, and we'll worry  
25 about Secretary Perry -- I'll get those resources where

1 it's most appropriate.

2 DR. GOLDBERG: Clearly that's a first cut.

3 DR. DUDLEY: Yes, but if I could comment on  
4 comment on that.

5 DR. GOLDBERG: Yes.

6 DR. DUDLEY: The \$10,000,000 went somewhere,  
7 Fred, but it didn't come down to the services -- and if  
8 you're going to be specific about it -- the services  
9 had had to take that Gulf War declassification money  
10 out of hide, and so if you want this to be really  
11 effective, it has to be specifically appropriated for  
12 the services -- the agencies which are going to take  
13 part in this program, not an upper level board which  
14 absorbs all the money which is going to be appropriated  
15 to it. So that perhaps specific legislation has to be  
16 considered.

17 DR. GOLDBERG: Well, perhaps we can agree and  
18 force the complaints of the services which are  
19 legitimate and make a recommendation that the resources  
20 currently allowed for the purpose are inadequate and  
21 that they should be substantially augmented, and that  
22 we recommend that this be brought to the attention of  
23 the OMB, White House, the Congress, that if they want  
24 the job done, the resources will have to be made  
25 available. Otherwise it will take a much longer time

1       probably, than already committed. Yes.

2               MR. S. GOLDBERG: Perhaps not only is this  
3 effort not being funded, but current contingency  
4 operations is reducing the budgets that are already  
5 funded, and a lot of these -- people told me -- they're  
6 only getting 60 percent of what they asked for this  
7 year because of contingency operations of Bosnia. So -  
8 -

9               DR. GOLDBERG: So the special  
10 declassification projects are detracting from the  
11 overall one.

12              BG. ARMSTRONG: Well, just general DOD  
13 operations.

14              MR. S. GOLDBERG: It's operational. Yes.  
15 Contingency operations in general.

16              BG. ARMSTRONG: Yes. Let me get back to  
17 something Bob said a little bit earlier that I wasn't  
18 aware of the concern that he expressed and that was a  
19 concern, particularly with the tough nuts, the Sec  
20 staff papers, the really tough declassification issues,  
21 if those things are shoved out to the end of the time  
22 period and then fall over the edge and by some trap  
23 door basically be beyond reach of this particular  
24 activity. It would seem to me that if that is a valid  
25 concern, which I assume it is, that it would be useful

1 to express that to -- that this panel express that  
2 concern -- that there ought to be some priority given  
3 within these efforts to those particular kinds of  
4 papers and it -- Once again I think you  
5 academic historians can do a fair job -- Bob's done, I  
6 think a fair job -- with part of that in identifying  
7 the kinds of papers and issues -- the kinds of files  
8 and issues that you're concerned about and that these  
9 be raised to the Secretary of Defense and some  
10 expressions be made that these be given priority  
11 consideration within the declassification efforts of  
12 each agency, and that each agency be asked to come back  
13 and tell -- or give an estimate of the consequences of  
14 that.

15 Because it's entirely -- it seems fair to me  
16 that if you want particular things done and those  
17 things are going to impact on how a particular agency,  
18 whether it's OSD, the Joint Staffs or somebody else,  
19 goes about implementing this Executive Order, that it's  
20 fair to ask them to come back and tell you what the  
21 cost is. And the cost may be that you only get 60  
22 percent of the total job done. There is no free lunch  
23 in this business. There just isn't.

24 And these guys -- Bill Dudley and several  
25 others have been more than eloquent and forthright in

1     what they're currently faced with and the resource  
2     problems they have.

3             And I think, from a historian's point of  
4     view, it's perfectly right to say this is the -- we  
5     like this effort, but within this body of information,  
6     this is what we really want. And then to have the  
7     people who have do the work get it, come back and say  
8     fine, if that's what you really want, this is going to  
9     be the consequence for what you asked us to do by the  
10    Executive Order.

11            DR. CLARKE: Can I comment on that? Not  
12    being a historian, I'm really more interested in  
13    records keeping -- in its existence and  
14    declassification. So I have a security clearance and I  
15    know that records are being dumped -- but I'm kind of  
16    overloaded and I don't like to waste my time here and  
17    your time. I'd like to see something more specific  
18    come out of the meeting here and the whole committee.

19            I think what you need is -- to give to Dr.  
20    Goldberg -- not now, but pretty shortly -- is what I  
21    call an ice breaker or three icebreakers. You need to  
22    give focus and legitimacy to our efforts, and you need  
23    to get a little bit more narrow than that Dave, and  
24    really get tight records groups and files within those  
25    records groups, perhaps some exempted ones, that with

1     your expertise you really think are valuable and can  
2     highlight those and say this is exactly -- there it is.  
3     This is where it is. Just as a start, a foot in the  
4     door. But something really concrete.

5                 Now I have an advisory committee too and I've  
6     got most of my academics -- academic historians. And I  
7     do send them out over the country, voluntarily, of  
8     course, and they lecture at West Point and they go down  
9     (inaudible) to talk to reserves in Leavenworth; they go  
10    out to MHI and talk to the war colleges -- those sorts  
11    of things.

12                Now I know you've all been to the  
13    Presidential Libraries and the National Archives,  
14    haven't we all, but if you go there sometimes, even to  
15    just drink a cup of coffee with the fellow who's there  
16    as an official member of the committee -- now that kind  
17    of rings a bell bureaucratically, and my report or my  
18    committee report to the Secretary of the Army and the  
19    Chief, when he sees -- he's actually beginning to see  
20    that these guys are not guys that just come to  
21    Washington, they've actually been there in their  
22    official capacity to Carlisle -- I've been to Carlisle  
23    unofficially many times to look at the records -- but --  
24    -- and they talk to my people -- and they talk Army in  
25    this case, but you can talk DOD or talk the records.

1       They talk the language and they justify these small  
2       things.

3               And yes, take a look at their suggestions,  
4       you know, a little bit more seriously than if they  
5       would maybe come to Washington for a couple days and  
6       have a little lunch -- that does little work and my  
7       expense for me. And they pointed out, you know, a few  
8       things that really I should -- maybe my people should  
9       concentrate on. They're not five percent, they're just  
10      maybe half of one percent of our total effort.

11             And when we do that also something else  
12      happens -- some of these records are really -- I  
13      hesitate to mention this -- but they're really badly  
14      organized -- and -- especially at the upper levels and  
15      the Lord knows exactly what records groups some of them  
16      end up in. That effort -- that focus can sometimes get  
17      the record management activity also in gear, because  
18      when you're organizing records for declassification,  
19      you often have to organize them for archival purposes  
20      too, and questions begin to be asked so there's more  
21      benefit than just declassification when you target,  
22      say, a small group of efforts -- this office, and DOD,  
23      and this time period or this office and JCS -- or these  
24      minutes at JCS.

25             And again, sometimes you have to -- it helps

1 to have an archivist come in and give you a  
2 presentation. But sometimes they get nervous and they  
3 don't know who they're presenting to, especially if  
4 there are other high officials there. And some times  
5 if you can meet with them ahead of time just to call  
6 them up on the phone and say hey, how you doing? My  
7 name's Joe, I teach this, that and the other thing, and  
8 I'm working on this and here's what I think some of the  
9 guys are really interested in having you address when  
10 you come to see us.

11 Then he can tell his boss or her boss, that  
12 here, this is what they really want, you know, and I'll  
13 try the official briefing and I'll (inaudible) -- and  
14 you get a lot more valuable information that way  
15 sometimes. It involves -- I dealt with the people I  
16 work with -- it involves Ira or John Shire (ph) or some  
17 of the people from Michigan and Pennsylvania and  
18 actually getting out there and talking to the guys.  
19 Even just a phone call sometimes -- or a visit if it's  
20 close by, and that face to face type thing, and it  
21 really does make a difference even though it may be a  
22 pain in the ass to get there many times. But sometimes  
23 when you go there as an official visitor, it just does  
24 something. It helps out a lot.

25 And so what I'm saying now is I think we

1       should say that -- listen to these recommendations the  
2       committee's giving. We've all recommended that we  
3       ourselves come up ASAP with some really specific hard  
4       nosed suggestions that are really high priority, high  
5       visibility, but they're doable but aereous (ph), and  
6       perhaps someone could be even in the excepted  
7       categories in order to break some of those open -- not  
8       nuclear weapons, but some things that could be broken  
9       open a little bit anyhow.

10               But that involves actually, your doing a  
11       little bit of legwork and going out after the archives  
12       and talking to somebody about this -- sometimes  
13       that's -- you've got teaching; you've got meetings;  
14       you've got this, you've got that. You've got a lot of  
15       things to do.

16               DR. GOLDBERG: So you want to frighten all  
17       these members on the panel?

18               PROF. TRACHTENBERG: I think we're all on the  
19       same wavelength. I'm hearing the same sorts of things  
20       being said in all kinds of different ways. Maybe we  
21       could come back to your initial question which is how  
22       should the report be drafted, and I --

23               DR. GOLDBERG: I'm pleased that you're  
24       playing the role of mediator here. We need one.

25               PROF. TRACHTENBERG: Yes, how can all these

1 different things that we've been saying be pulled  
2 together and pitched in a report? And I think  
3 everybody has said start out with the resources  
4 problem. The example of the Defense Nuclear Agency  
5 report that I cited before can be cited because the  
6 figures are so compelling, but not in the way that's  
7 critical of the people who put it together. Because --  
8 I liked it because I think these people being office.

9 The line we should take is these people have  
10 been asked to square the circle, and what are they  
11 supposed to do? They can't say this. But we can say  
12 it. We're outsiders. Ideally the solution would be to  
13 allocate many resources, but we have to be realistic,  
14 and if in fact resources are going to be constrained,  
15 this is our concern.

16 Our concern is that a rigid cap system, 15  
17 percent a year, is going to lead people, for totally  
18 understandable bureaucratic reasons, to focus on the  
19 materials that are of least interest, to historians and  
20 to the public as a whole. We understand that they're  
21 constrained by the mandates of the Executive Order, but  
22 we'd like that fact to be counter-balanced by a certain  
23 amount of effort going into the high priority areas  
24 that we've identified.

25 And then, kind of lay out what we propose to

1 do as a committee, in terms of talking to people in as  
2 informal a basis as possible, as cooperative basis as  
3 possible, getting a sense for the philosophy underlying  
4 the declassification programs, getting people to open  
5 up with us and discuss their problems with us in such a  
6 way that we can have some meaningful input into a  
7 solution here, and then stress the point about a pilot  
8 project, the -- focusing on the OSD, possibly taking  
9 Bob's suggestions -- have specific files. I think that  
10 would basically do the trick.

11 DR. GOLDBERG: It's a good, sympathetic  
12 approach. What we need, I think will need. I'd like  
13 to now have us address ourselves to two related  
14 elements which require prioritizing, namely, the  
15 organizations that we would like to put emphasis on --  
16 and we've already mentioned some, the Presidential  
17 Libraries, OSD, JCS, because that's where most of the  
18 high policy materials are; and second, the subject  
19 areas related to those elements that we would like to  
20 see addressed by OSD, Presidential Libraries, et  
21 cetera.

22 One other thought occurred to me in this  
23 connection, then, is that perhaps if we are going to  
24 place priorities on these particular elements of DOD,  
25 we should also perhaps point out that they ought to be

1 given priority for resources also, if we're going to  
2 demand more of them than perhaps the other elements, at  
3 least for the time being, I would think for the first  
4 year or two possibly, and it could well take that long  
5 if not more. And their agencies are going to need the  
6 additional assistance to begin with.

7           The others may well need it later on, because  
8 presumably we will want to get similar subject areas  
9 allocated to the Offices of the Secretary of the  
10 Services, the Chiefs of Staff, the Chief of Naval  
11 Operations, Commandant of the Marine Corps -- at least  
12 one office in the Marine Corps is concerned with  
13 policy. That sort of thing. They could come after,  
14 but if we are going to establish priorities by  
15 organization, then I think it's up to us to say this is  
16 what we would like to see done; we think that can be  
17 done if they are given some additional help.

18           I'd like you to address yourselves to that  
19 now. Are we pretty well agreed on the actual  
20 organizations to which we'd like to give priority?  
21 Yes.

22           MR. S. GOLDBERG: I was just going to say if  
23 you prioritize these organizations and just give them  
24 the additional resources, you know we've said that  
25 these organizations, these materials are going to take

1 the most coordination to get reviewed. And if the  
2 services don't get additional resources that are going  
3 to have to do the coordination on these materials, then  
4 there's a little mismatch there. I think everybody  
5 who's going to have to coordinate on these DOD  
6 documents is going to need additional resources to get  
7 that done, or you're just going to drain out what we  
8 have to do on our own.

9 DR. GOLDBERG: Tony?

10 MR. PASSARELLA: Let me try to help you put  
11 in perspective the resources issue. Last calendar  
12 year, '95, the Department of Defense processed and  
13 completed over 103,000 feet of information at request,  
14 at a cost of possibly over \$33,000,000. We're talking  
15 here about a tremendously amount more of work than that  
16 -- that 103,000. That's my great concern, because  
17 we're going to fall on our faces here if we're not  
18 emphasizing we've got to put the resources behind these  
19 people who are working so hard to do this. If we  
20 don't, it's not going to succeed, no matter how many  
21 lists you give people, no matter how many plans are  
22 prepared or whatever.

23 And we're talking, you know, \$10,000,000 for  
24 the Gulf War thing; another \$33,000,000 for the Emquoia  
25 (ph). I don't know even have the costs in for NPRs

1 (ph). I mean we're spending a lot of money  
2 declassifying information. This is so much bigger than  
3 anything we've ever done.

4 BG. ARMSTRONG: Tony, was that the entire  
5 Department of Defense -- 103,000?

6 MR. PASSARELLA: That's the entire Department  
7 of Defense.

8 BG. ARMSTRONG: Okay.

9 MR. PASSARELLA: That's just FOIA.

10 DR. WAMPLER: How does that break down  
11 between search and review? I mean what component of  
12 that --

13 MR. PASSARELLA: That's complete cost.

14 DR. WAMPLER: Yes, but what -- you're  
15 comparing it a little bit (inaudible) but research is -  
16 -

17 MR. PASSARELLA: Not much is research. The  
18 most expensive is in review. The search problem is --  
19 you come down here and you couldn't find it -- and  
20 that's --

21 DR. WAMPLER: Okay.

22 MR. BROWN: Another aspect to keep in mind --  
23 we're talking DOD and the military departments of DOD  
24 agencies right now, but soon this will require  
25 coordination outside of the Department of Defense so

1 we've got to make sure that their priorities are the  
2 same priorities that we have, otherwise ours will  
3 impact on their staff.

4 BG. ARMSTRONG: Well it goes -- they go into  
5 a FOIA queue, which is a chronological queue.

6 OBSERVER: But there is no assurance that it  
7 would go into a FOIA-like queue. I mean there are no  
8 procedures for inter-agency coordination established at  
9 this point, and that's what Nancy Smith and I attended  
10 a meeting on a week ago -- this capture program.  
11 There's no procedure yet to assure that, you know, my  
12 stuff is really important, so it's going to go to the  
13 top of the pile, and I'm CIA.

14 BG. ARMSTRONG: There is a procedure but the  
15 procedure is it goes to the bottom of the queue. My  
16 stuff -- my history --

17 MR. PASSARELLA: With FOIA --

18 BG. ARMSTRONG: For FOIA, yes.

19 OBSERVER: I'm not talking about FOIA  
20 though -- this is an automatic inter-agency --

21 DR. GOLDBERG: Alright, therefore we do want  
22 an effort about --

23 MR. S. GOLDBERG: They're also reviewing  
24 their records, so they're going to do their materials  
25 first before your coordination.

1 MR. PASSARELLA: So there needs to be a  
2 government-wide procedure for processing the inter-  
3 agency coordination.

4 DR. WAMPLER: I thought well, the inter-  
5 agency commissions set up by the Executive Order is  
6 supposed to try to facilitate that alignment of  
7 priorities.

8 MR. PASSARELLA: As far as an issue, though,  
9 if it isn't done well, you can end up with stalemate  
10 because you're not getting things back.

11 OBSERVER: So that people outside the  
12 government cannot establish priorities within 26 --

13 DR. WAMPLER: No, that's the real high one;  
14 but I thought there was another lower one -- the one  
15 that has each agency rep on it.

16 DR. GOLDBERG: Appeals -- that's an appeals -  
17 - it's an appeals panel.

18 PROF. TRACHTENBERG: Well, they'll not get  
19 involved with trying to establish --

20 DR. GOLDBERG: No, the other one -- council -  
21 - is the one that would be concerned with the means,  
22 procedures. It's not in existence yet.

23 DR. WAMPLER: Well then, should we, as part  
24 of our recommendations, point out the need to try to  
25 address this on --

1 DR. GOLDBERG: On a broader scale --  
2 government-wide.

3 DR. WAMPLER: Because it's going to affect  
4 not just DOD but everyone. You kick theirs to the  
5 bottom of the list because they're kicking yours to the  
6 bottom of the list. Everybody slows down.

7 DR. GOLDBERG: Well, of course you know, we  
8 don't have to wait. I mean we might have to wait a  
9 long time to the coordination. I've sometimes waited a  
10 year or two to get the history cleared by NFC or State  
11 or CIA. But there are many DOD records that can be  
12 cleared, presumably, leaving those from outside  
13 agencies to be done later. It complicates things, but  
14 I mean if you already want to get anything out, that's  
15 what you may have to do. Instead of waiting for  
16 everybody, including everything. If you take a set of  
17 files or a group, you may have to do it piece meal.  
18 And I admit that's difficult, and it's complicated.

19 DR. CLARKE: If we don't get started, it  
20 won't get done.

21 DR. GOLDBERG: Beg pardon?

22 DR. CLARKE: If we don't start, it won't get  
23 done.

24 DR. GOLDBERG: Yes, true. So I think  
25 something we're going to have to face up to is that

1       this is going to be a long and involved and difficult  
2       process. I think we can help. I think we get -- more  
3       may get done as a result of what we do here during the  
4       next few years that would have gotten done otherwise.  
5       So to that extent, what we are doing can be useful, and  
6       I'd like to see us continue.

7               Yes, we're going to have to make some very  
8       general recommendations, but what I'm trying to talk  
9       about now is the more specific ones. I think we're  
10      agreed that we could report that we would like to see  
11      emphasis placed on Presidential Libraries, OSD and JCS.  
12      The question is do we want to suggest any subject areas  
13      or clusters of subject areas. And I say suggest,  
14      knowing we don't know a lot more than that at this  
15      point. Do we want to be specific in that regard?  
16      We've had a number of suggestions already made here  
17      today. Do we want to say some thing concrete on this  
18      subject and say we would like to see these particular  
19      areas in particular looked at? Or given top priority  
20      within OSD, Presidential Libraries, and so forth?

21             I think they would have to be linked to --  
22      mention subject areas, you'd have to link them to  
23      specific organizations, because I don't think you can  
24      do it all the way across the board immediately.

25             PROF. MAY: Are you speaking of specific

1 subjects as the Presidential Libraries spoke of Eastern  
2 Europe and --

3 DR. GOLDBERG: Even more specific, if  
4 possible, yes. Correct.

5 PROF. MAY: How much more specific?

6 DR. GOLDBERG: Well, nuclear weapons  
7 planning, well for instance.

8 BG. ARMSTRONG: Let me suggest what the Java  
9 tank for how she was going to do the Joint Chiefs of  
10 Staff files. She has listed in there the files series  
11 exemptions. And I realize that some of these things  
12 are pretty general, but on the other hand, some of them  
13 aren't. Here's a file thing: "Evaluation of plans for  
14 the strategic air offensive". Now Elliot, that's your  
15 bag. Do you want that kind of stuff?

16 PROF. COHEN: Sure.

17 BG. ARMSTRONG: Okay, fine. The historians  
18 have to tell us that you know. That -- some other of  
19 this stuff you probably don't care about. So --

20 PROF. COHEN: Well -- you're right, I guess.  
21 The import of that, I think, for the panel is that you  
22 do have to dig fairly deeply into each of these areas  
23 before you can say anything that's meaningful. That's  
24 why I trust a certain amount of frustration with some  
25 of these plans because there isn't even that level of

1 detail. But I think -- you know, one advantage in  
2 having a self-serving discussion with the Joint Staff  
3 about what is in these files and what do the files look  
4 like.

5 But I think the problem that poses for the  
6 panel is that it means you do go through this piece  
7 meal, but I don't really see how there's -- frankly,  
8 there's that much that's general that we could say --  
9 aside from everybody seems to agree that all of this is  
10 under-resourced.

11 BG. ARMSTRONG: But -- Al had suggested  
12 that -- and I agree with him -- I think that your  
13 interest, at least initially, primarily focuses on high  
14 policy. This tends to be found in three sets of  
15 organizational records plus certain additional  
16 positional records that reside in each of the services  
17 record groups, and that taking some time to listen to  
18 and having the people come in to you and tell you or  
19 deputying someone like Bob to come and listen over  
20 there where you can actually get into a holding area  
21 and set down with the person who has the knowledge, go  
22 through at this. It's some thing that I think is going  
23 to be required. It's not required, you don't have to  
24 do the same level for the Army, the Navy, the Marines  
25 and the Air Force.

1                   And I think that you also -- when you're  
2     talking about going to the Secretary and talking about  
3     resources -- I think that Al's suggestion that if  
4     you're going to focus initially on these kinds of  
5     records -- initially, Mr. Secretary, we believe that  
6     the -- while we acknowledge that every effort is under-  
7     resourced and under-funded, basically it's unfunded is  
8     another way of saying it because there's no additional  
9     funds -- we believe that your priority if you choose to  
10    put in additional resources, which is what we  
11    recommend, should go to supporting these areas.

12                   I understand the coordination problem, but  
13    I'll tell you, if you try to salami-slice out each of  
14    the -- what is going to be a small pot of money, you  
15    may end up getting nothing. And I know -- everybody  
16    would like to have money out of this, and it's a cinch  
17    I'm not going to get any money out of it. I know that.

18                   COL. PONNWITZ: One area I'd like to comment  
19    on -- I concur wholeheartedly with the priorities  
20    established through the organizations. The topics or  
21    subjects you pick are really going to have to be  
22    thought out well, because the product is not going to  
23    be a perfectly organized, catalogued, indexed, under  
24    classification product. When we get done, even though  
25    you may have searched your files and pulled out a

1 particular subject, references to that subject are  
2 buried everywhere, and in the end, you're going to have  
3 a whole lot of unclassified documents that aren't  
4 organized particularly well.

5 And that is where the challenge is going to  
6 be to the user, to make sense of all this and put it  
7 together in some meaningful way that you can derive  
8 conclusions and interact things that aren't interacted  
9 right now and won't be when you get the product.

10 So I think we have to be very careful when we  
11 say we want specific information focused to this  
12 subject, realize you're not going to get all of it;  
13 you're going to get some of it and be patient for the  
14 rest because we won't know where it is until we're all  
15 done through the declassification process, if then.

16 DR. GOLDBERG: The rule is that with the  
17 exception of JCS, the higher the level, the more poorly  
18 organized the files -- and I speak quite seriously in  
19 saying this from personal experience. The higher the  
20 level, the more difficult it really will be to use the  
21 files and get the information for this purpose of  
22 declassification -- the more diffused they are.

23 But it's another one of the problems -- there  
24 are very many -- that we face in attacking this  
25 problem, and I think we do have to attack it.

1           The question still remains, do we want to  
2       specify any particular subject areas in connection with  
3       the top level organizations that we've identified, and  
4       I think agreed on. I believe there's a consensus on  
5       the organizations that ought to receive emphasis  
6       initially. Now do we want to go beyond that and see if  
7       we would like -- we suggest, we recommend that priority  
8       be given to -- for example, like the pilot project --  
9       to these particular areas?

10           DR. WAMPLER: Well, I think that would have  
11       to be gauged in terms of this list that Dave Armstrong  
12       pointed to, otherwise you're telling the archivist to  
13       go search your stuff.

14           DR. GOLDBERG: Well, it's a question of how  
15       much --

16           DR. WAMPLER: Well we also don't know how  
17       many boxes or files --

18           DR. GOLDBERG: No, I'm not talking about the  
19       amount of files -- how many items we want to include in  
20       our request? I mean we can -- this is an initial  
21       effort. This is the first time. We don't want to  
22       overwhelm anybody. What we're really, I think, ought  
23       to be doing is giving an indication of the things that  
24       we'll probably be interested in.

25           DR. WAMPLER: Okay, then I would state it in

1 terms of saying -- if we want to buy the list like that  
2 -- saying this is our sense of our top ten issues, and  
3 we will be guided by this general sense of priorities  
4 in making further recommendations about individual  
5 accessions and files -- to indicate that that's sort of  
6 the map or the guidelines we're following. I -- I  
7 don't see any point beyond that in developing a list of  
8 subjects to turn in.

9 BG. ARMSTRONG: The problem with that --  
10 Walter you're the guy who knows the files I would worry  
11 about. If you list an issue, and you're talking about  
12 the JCS files, that may or may not cut across whole  
13 sets of files, and you really have to say guys, --  
14 specificity is just required here, and specificity  
15 means work, and it means specific work.

16 DR. GOLDBERG: But is it required --

17 OBSERVER: -- definitely, very definitely  
18 have to key it into the wording of the JCS files --  
19 there's no other way to do it.

20 DR. GOLDBERG: Yes, but we don't have to do  
21 it in this report. We can do it directly with the  
22 organizations involved, it's the way it ought to be  
23 done. We give them to top-level general items. And  
24 then we specify to them, and not necessarily in this  
25 report.

1 DR. WAMPLER: Okay, so you say you want  
2 nuclear weapons, strategic plans and operations, Korean  
3 War, Viet Nam War, NEDRNE (ph) -- and you know,  
4 alliance relations -- I mean, you know, you kick them  
5 off and you say these are the things that really  
6 interest us.

7 DR. GOLDBERG: That's right, -- and we will -

8 - DR. WAMPLER: Pursue this sense of priorities  
9 in making your further decisions.

10 PROF. TRACHTENBERG: I sense that this is not  
11 an issue. We don't have to put it in the report, if  
12 you want to have something just very general, go ahead  
13 and do it. It doesn't mean anything. We -- it's been  
14 clear enough from our discussion today the general  
15 sorts of issues that we place -- we consider to be most  
16 important. There have been representatives from OSD,  
17 JCS who are actually going to be doing this work, heard  
18 this. If they want to fine tune their understanding of  
19 our thinking, you do this in the process of  
20 conversation. It just emerges naturally.

21 DR. WAMPLER: No, what I'm thinking --  
22 correct me if I'm wrong Dr. Goldberg, but you want to  
23 give these people a sense that not only are we making  
24 recommendations, we have a rationale for our  
25 recommendations.

1 DR. GOLDBERG: Yes, of course.

2 DR. WAMPLER: I mean that we're not just  
3 picking these things out of thin air and saying we'd  
4 like to see this, we'd like to see this and we'd like  
5 to see this. But we chose these with priorities in  
6 mind.

7 PROF. TRACHTENBERG: Is there any doubt?

8 DR. WAMPLER: Well, there might be. Might  
9 be.

10 PROF. TRACHTENBERG: Well, then, let the  
11 people who have the doubts express them. But -- but  
12 the important thing is that the people doing the actual  
13 declassification work and to the extent that they're  
14 interested in our thinking can ask what our thinking is  
15 to factor into their own work process.

16 MR. HALL: Can I request again the POW  
17 information be requested and put on that list because  
18 as it stands all wars, including the Korean War, up to  
19 and including the present -- so it isn't listed --  
20 isn't limited to any one record. And I'm speaking not  
21 just for myself but for different organizations, the  
22 National Alliance of Families and a number of family  
23 members -- they would very much like to have you  
24 consider this a priority. It's more than a few  
25 individual interests. It's a large (inaudible)

1 interest.

2 MS. SCHAUBLE: I would like to say from the  
3 point of view of efficiency and process, you really  
4 have to work the way the records are organized. If you  
5 try to get too specific on topics, people are going to  
6 jump from one place to another in the records and  
7 you're never really going to get anything done as a  
8 whole. I have to work on a series -- a record series  
9 basis in order to work efficiently.

10 JCS records may be organized differently so  
11 that it makes sense there to work on a topical basis.  
12 But you're going to have to look at the way each  
13 organization's records are organized in order to decide  
14 what is the most efficient way to tackle those records,  
15 because I'm sure we don't want to make recommendations  
16 to an organization that's actually in a way that's  
17 going to impede their efforts as opposed to expediting  
18 it.

19 DR. GOLDBERG: Well, the Executive Order --  
20 the clients do talk in topical areas, but I've been  
21 skeptical of that also. I don't think we will or we  
22 should give very specific lists in this kind of report.  
23 If we're going to do that, we would do it directly in  
24 dealing with the agencies involved. Here, I think,  
25 what to do is to give the people whom we send this

1 report the notion of what we consider the important  
2 things that we would like to see addressed, and we can  
3 list some of those. This is the sort of thing we think  
4 ought to be emphasized. In dealing with agencies  
5 directly we will -- we will specify more precisely what  
6 it is we're interested in. I think that would serve  
7 the purpose.

8 MR. S. GOLDBERG: This is a quarterly panel  
9 meeting. The next meeting is scheduled for May. I  
10 think -- I don't see why you have to bite off too much  
11 at this first meeting. I think talking about the  
12 resource problem, the coordination problem, trying to  
13 emphasize a higher level OSD, JCS, Presidential thing,  
14 is enough. I don't see where you really need to get  
15 into the details of specific documents first. Let's  
16 chew on these issues first --

17 DR. GOLDBERG: We're not talking about  
18 specific - MR. S. GOLDBERG: -- for two or  
19 three months.

20 DR. GOLDBERG: We're not talking about  
21 specific documents, obviously.

22 MR. S. GOLDBERG: This discussion --

23 DR. GOLDBERG: We're talking in general  
24 areas. Ernest?

25 PROF. MAY: Well, it seems to me you can take

1 three topics. You can take the two that were  
2 identified for the Presidential Libraries because they  
3 have already set aside documents in those areas and  
4 they're represented what the problems are for us --  
5 endorse their effort -- they've taken the lead in. The  
6 Assistant Secretary at the Department has asked to  
7 further that effort, assist in that effort -- you urge  
8 that they do so -- that seems to me to make sense.

9 Then, there's an argument for choosing one  
10 other subject and I think you in fact nailed it --  
11 subject familiar to us, the U.S./Soviet Strategic  
12 Nuclear Competition, because -- for a different reason.  
13 Not because it's been identified and because they're  
14 well on the way, but because it provides, I think as  
15 good a test as you can get of the exempted categories.  
16 Every one of these except the one for the protection of  
17 the president and the vice president.

18 And that seems to me -- and I've had a  
19 disturbing sense throughout our discussion that part of  
20 what we ought to be about has been neglected, because  
21 we have been tending to think about this in terms of  
22 what scholars want in their queue of interest, but if I  
23 understand the intent of the Executive Order, it is to  
24 serve that interest, but over a period -- not  
25 immediately, but over the five year period, but with an

1 outcome, if it works, in which the number of exempted  
2 documents at the end of the five year period is reduced  
3 to its minimum. And it is defensible in these terms,  
4 in terms of -- with most of these being conditioned up,  
5 think seriously and demonstrably -- those modifiers are  
6 there.

7 So it seems to me to be important at this  
8 stage to find out how hard it is to identify those  
9 things that you want to have exempt at the end and to  
10 try to ease the process that everything else looks --  
11 so you know how to identify and find the things that  
12 need to be kept classified.

13 DR. GOLDBERG: Yes, I think that using  
14 Presidential Libraries' plan would be a good handle for  
15 moving into OSD and JCS. They do specify the areas.  
16 We could add another one. We might be well advised to  
17 confine ourselves to a limited number of that sort --  
18 and say this is just a beginning; these are examples or  
19 instances of the direction in which we should be going.  
20 We will have some more to recommend in the future.

21 COL. PONNWITZ: Sir, I'd like to add one  
22 comment, if I may. I concur whole heartedly with  
23 Professor May's comment. I would ask that you put one  
24 caveat in there to you know, satisfy the concerns  
25 regarding the POWs that since this POW issue is so

1 significant, and since obviously some records have been  
2 missing over time, that in your declassification search  
3 if you find any reference to POWs that it be  
4 highlighted and segregated so that those leads can be  
5 followed. Not necessarily focus the search to POWs,  
6 but as you do your declassification if you find  
7 material that obviously might have been missing or was  
8 neglected before that it be highlighted.

9 DR. GOLDBERG: Alright. That may be  
10 possible.

11 MR. S. GOLDBERG: That sort of effort is  
12 happening within the DOD at all times. The CPMO people  
13 are coming at all of us asking do you have any more --  
14 have you found any more POW stuff, and you know, when  
15 we find it we tell them and it proceeds through --

16 COL. PONNWITZ: And all I'm asking is that --  
17 that you reemphasize that here in this report.

18 BG. ARMSTRONG: One thing I think might -- I  
19 think should be done and that is, you're going to  
20 address the issue of resources, and you're also going  
21 to address the fact that the historical community has  
22 certain interests that it wishes to highlight and it  
23 wishes to have influence the declassification efforts  
24 of the agencies. I think you ought to also acknowledge  
25 that the degree to which those interests change the

1       declassification efforts that have originally been  
2       planned, they may in fact, without additional resources  
3       -- they will influence how the declassification process  
4       goes and they may well either delay it or result in  
5       additional costs. Because every time -- every time you  
6       change something or make it more specific, you make it  
7       more effective for the historian, but you may well make  
8       it less efficient for the declassifier.

9                PROF. MAY: What I was suggesting actually  
10       was not -- that that not be done. You have the two  
11       topics which have been chosen by the Presidential  
12       Libraries. They already --

13               BG. ARMSTRONG: Yes.

14               PROF. MAY: -- but that's a -- it's not our  
15       desire to have Viet Nam, Eastern Europe --

16               BG. ARMSTRONG: I thought you were going to  
17       extend those into OSD and JCS records.

18               PROF. MAY: I would start with the  
19       Presidential Libraries.

20               BG. ARMSTRONG: Oh, okay.

21               PROF. MAY: The records are OSD. That's part  
22       of their problem is getting the coordination and I  
23       suggested that you add one other, not for the historian  
24       interest in it, but to pass a test of how you apply the  
25       exemptions and how you -- that seems to me to be the

1     hardest thing is to figure out how you determine what  
2     needs to be -- remain classified at the end of five  
3     years. And we ought to suggest what we can to help  
4     that. And I think if we take something hard and help  
5     test how much it would cost.

6             BG. ARMSTRONG: Well, if you take something  
7     hard, you're going to expend a lot of effort doing  
8     that, and that's going to have costs for how you  
9     execute the overall program. That's the point I'm  
10    trying to make.

11            DR. WAMPLER: But I think it's important.  
12    Say you take nuclear -- or the nuclear competition, and  
13    one of the things we ask for in terms of briefing and  
14    liaison is say, under your existing plans, how do your  
15    plans address the review of these issues? Okay. That  
16    gives you your baseline. If you want to fiddle with  
17    it, then you start feeling out the increased costs that  
18    you're concerned about, but in some way you're just  
19    trying to get some idea of the contours.

20            I mean I'm assuming that under whatever plan  
21    you've got, in each yearly tranche, that is further  
22    disaggregated down into category 1, 2, and 3 -- and  
23    maybe 3's finally getting smaller and the other two  
24    groups growing in size as a portion of the overall  
25    part. How is that happening? How are our priorities

1 being reflected in your existing plans and how do we  
2 evaluate that so that we have a sense of what it costs  
3 for the recommendations that we've made? Because we're  
4 making them just in a vacuum.

5 BG. ARMSTRONG: Yes, that's right, but that's  
6 going to require agencies to come and tell you --

7 DR. WAMPLER: Or -- I think we should have  
8 some ongoing connection between now and May, not just  
9 have this stop and then pick up again three months from  
10 now.

11 PROF. LEFFLER: I worry about the emphasis on  
12 the nuclear competition issue. If you recall, Nancy  
13 specifically said that they had identified things that  
14 they believe could be easily declassified, and that was  
15 one of their benchmark criteria. She also said that  
16 she would be equally happy with a different approach  
17 and just go to one or two libraries and just try to  
18 cover those libraries completely for all issues.

19 My sense is that focusing on an issue like  
20 the strategic nuclear competition is going to absorb so  
21 many resources because they're the most sensitive  
22 issues of all, that there's going to be a huge part of  
23 the academic community which is not interested in that,  
24 but interested in all sorts of other policy issues  
25 which will get nothing, while tremendous amounts of

1 resources are focused on this very specific issue.

2 Keeping in mind also that this committee is  
3 really weighted very heavily amongst the academic  
4 people, the people that are particularly interested in  
5 the strategic issue, and it may -- we may be regarded  
6 very negatively for us to focus specifically on that  
7 issue which is clearly the interest of most of the  
8 people on this committee, and not the larger interest,  
9 speaking of the whole academic area.

10 DR. GOLDBERG: But there are other subjects  
11 you were going to propose that incur in your interest  
12 also and that will also take --

13 PROF. LEFFLER: No, I -- I --

14 DR. GOLDBERG: -- a lot of time.

15 PROF. LEFFLER: I don't believe frankly, --  
16 my own view is that we should not identify specific  
17 subjects at this time. Having used enormous amounts of  
18 resources, I very much share the view that the easiest  
19 way to go through and really get things accomplished is  
20 by taking categories of records, perhaps just the way  
21 you enumerated them Bob, on your list for example. If  
22 you really want to get something accomplished quickly,  
23 you identify the categories of high level, like you did  
24 for the OSD records, and have them go through those  
25 systematically for all the issues that may fall within

1       there.

2               Now, if your own interests -- and most of our  
3       interests are in atomic and strategic things -- are  
4       immediately covered when you say RG330, Assistant  
5       Secretary for Atomic Affairs. You're going to get a  
6       lot of stuff in that and it will be done very  
7       systematically. You go through ISA, you're going to  
8       get a lot of other things.

9               So I would say -- my suggestion is we even  
10      try not to do too much today -- I agree with you,  
11      Sheldon, very -- that we have identified high level  
12      things that we want to regard, and that we begin next  
13      time with a specific focus on OSD, RG330 and in  
14      discussing it in some detail, we make a decision. Do  
15      we want to go through it -- through these file numbers  
16      like you identified? Or do we alternatively want to go  
17      through it by identifying certain subjects?

18              But I also think that focusing or putting a  
19      statement in about the Presidential Libraries, like you  
20      said, Ernie, is extremely on target. That they've done  
21      the work -- and we all know it's high level -- let them  
22      go ahead and try to do that and begin to allocate  
23      resources for them.

24              DR. WAMPLER: But I think what we were  
25      discussing was not making suggestion that they focus,

1 but saying, these are our primary interests. If you're  
2 going to arrange briefings, that gives them a way to  
3 focus their briefings. To come in and say, okay, these  
4 are the real hard nuts to crack, that you indicate an  
5 interest in; these are the problems involved; these are  
6 the costs involved -- which gives us some more data  
7 upon which we can then make our recommendations.

8 We know more about the universe we're working  
9 in other than our own scholarly interests, more about  
10 what it means on the other side, and if you pick the  
11 hardest one -- nuclear, if you want to go into  
12 intelligence, it may even be harder in some ways --  
13 you've got to figure that other things are going to be  
14 less difficult than that and you can then factor back  
15 from that by using your worse case to get a sense of  
16 just what the problems are. And you're just using that  
17 as a way of structuring the briefings in your initial  
18 communication with these people, not as just a way of  
19 saying this is what we think you should focus on.

20 PROF. TRACHTENBERG: Why not leave the  
21 structure of the briefings up to them? Because you're  
22 saying this is what we're interested in, you're saying,  
23 speak to this specifically and it's distorting the  
24 structure of the briefing. Just let -- let them --  
25 they're the ones that have to do this whole

1       declassification project. Let's let them do the -- lay  
2       out what their thinking is, their whole philosophy of  
3       approaching it. If they have problems --

4               DR. WAMPLER: But shouldn't we lay out  
5       questions we'd like to have answered, rather than have  
6       them come here to air a briefing and then discover that  
7       they're not prepared to answer the questions we're  
8       interested in.

9               PROF. TRACHTENBERG: I think maybe the people  
10      who actually do this can answer this. What do you want  
11      from us? What do you want from us? Do you want  
12      specific questions that we -- you do? What --  
13      questions of what nature?

14              MR. BROWN: We have submitted plans for  
15      declassification --

16              DR. GOLDBERG: Can you speak up, please?

17              MR. BROWN: -- following guidelines that were  
18      laid out by Steve Garfinkle when he gave us guidelines  
19      for agency declassification. And we followed them.  
20      And that's what we reported in our plan. And those  
21      plans were then approved by Steve Garfinkle, which was  
22      the requirement, that Steve Garfinkle approve those  
23      plans. He did.

24              Now if there's a problem with those plans, or  
25      we need to put something else in those plans, I don't

1 want to keep coming in and taking an essay test and  
2 getting an F. I want to know what it is you want to  
3 know.

4 PROF. COHEN: Then isn't the solution then  
5 that we ask to be briefed on declassification plans?

6 DR. GOLDBERG: That's one of the things we're  
7 talking about, yes.

8 PROF. COHEN: And then you have -- I don't  
9 think people are disagreeing as much as it may sound.  
10 If you have a briefing on the declassification plans,  
11 then you have a conversation basis.

12 DR. GOLDBERG: Well, in asking for a  
13 briefing, I think it probably would be desirable to ask  
14 for some thing conditional that may not be there, to  
15 give us more of an idea of the kinds of things that  
16 they have that we might get at, and even in terms of  
17 some specifics. What sort of things do you have on  
18 this subject? Or this subject?

19 PROF. COHEN: Well, I don't think --

20 DR. GOLDBERG: Well, some may be prepared on  
21 their own and others may not be --

22 PROF. COHEN: Well, if you asked to be  
23 briefed on the declassification plan, they wouldn't  
24 submit, you know, here's a list of the major -- certain  
25 files that we have --

1 DR. GOLDBERG: Not necessarily, no. Some  
2 might and others might not, that's why you want to give  
3 them some guidance at least, but I sense from this  
4 discussion that perhaps we need to give some more  
5 thought and some more attention to whether we do want  
6 to specify any areas, any topics, subjects, whatever.

7 We might be well advised for the time being,  
8 to confine ourselves to saying that we think that  
9 emphasis ought to be placed on these particular offices  
10 -- the Presidential Libraries, OSD, JCS. We think that  
11 in order for this to be done, because these are the  
12 places where the most important and many of the most  
13 sensitive materials are, in order for this to be  
14 accomplished additional resources are needed. Now we  
15 think that the most serious consideration ought to be  
16 given at the highest levels to provide additional  
17 resources to these agencies in order to do this.

18 We would like, in the future, perhaps in the  
19 near future, to provide some further thoughts on the  
20 subject of how they might go about this. The  
21 particular areas of greatest interest and importance to  
22 the public perhaps ought to be addressed in some order  
23 of priority. We're going to give it some more thought,  
24 and in the future, we would like to provide this kind  
25 of material information.

1 Does that strike you as a reasonable  
2 approach?

3 DR. WAMPLER: As a way of being even more  
4 concrete, say on the basis of the Fowler series  
5 exceptions on the JCS --

6 DR. GOLDBERG: Yes.

7 DR. WAMPLER: Can they very quickly give you  
8 a little mark to the side saying second year, third  
9 year, fourth year? When they get at these? I mean  
10 that at least would --

11 DR. GOLDBERG: Well, can't we get that  
12 directly from them instead --

13 DR. WAMPLER: If they come prepared to  
14 answer.

15 DR. GOLDBERG: Beg pardon?

16 DR. WAMPLER: If they come prepared to  
17 answer.

18 DR. GOLDBERG: Sure and that's --

19 DR. WAMPLER: That's -- I would tell you --

20 DR. GOLDBERG: That's what we would have to  
21 do with them directly. It would not be part of this  
22 report.

23 DR. WAMPLER: No.

24 DR. GOLDBERG: Part of this report we would  
25 say, we look forward to having briefings, of having

1 direct connections with all of these organizations or  
2 working with them to achieve the goals which we had in  
3 mind.

4 BG. ARMSTRONG: I think it would be fair, if  
5 you want a JCS briefing, if before you get that  
6 briefing, you go through their plan and you tick off --  
7 first of all, you tick off questions like Bob has --  
8 when are you going to get to this stuff? The second  
9 thing you tick off is okay, looking at all these pages  
10 of things, I'm interested in -- and maybe each  
11 scholar's interested in this general subject area could  
12 list four or five of these that he particularly wants  
13 to know what's in there.

14 You're not going to get him to come in and  
15 tell you what's in -- in any sort of detail -- in every  
16 one of these exemptions. But if you have a particular  
17 interest in how Joe Stalin was going to go up in a  
18 mushroom cloud in 1952, then you go in there, you find  
19 where that is or is likely to be in these exemptions,  
20 and you ask them to talk about it as best they can,  
21 defining aids that define that particular file.

22 But you've got to ask them in advance. You  
23 don't -- you're not going to get a GS-13 over here --  
24 you might get a 15 that could tell you that, but you're  
25 never going to get a 13, and the 15 works for

1 Passarelli, he doesn't want --

2 PROF. COHEN: You can do that on the basis of  
3 the information of the Joint Chiefs --

4 BG. ARMSTRONG: Yes.

5 PROF. COHEN: Some of these --

6 BG. ARMSTRONG: Sure.

7 PROF. COHEN: -- you don't have enough  
8 information to do that.

9 BG. ARMSTRONG: Well, you know SAC -- I mean  
10 Curtis Lemay.

11 DR. GOLDBERG: Would it be useful to have  
12 members of the panel specialize in one declassification  
13 plan or another so that somebody has some  
14 responsibility in some special interests in a  
15 particular area, JCS, OSD policy or some of the others,  
16 and would be prepared to interact with the  
17 representatives of that agency in a knowledgeable way?  
18 Otherwise we might well diffuse our efforts and talk  
19 around the subject instead of getting to the heart of  
20 it? Perhaps we can work that out with you individually  
21 to see which particular declassification plans you  
22 would be prepared to undertake.

23 MR. DAVIS: Talking about a few of the  
24 category 1 or 2 records, what is everybody thinking of  
25 with respect to the type of ordinary, systematic review

1 without redaction or some sort of declassification  
2 review with redaction? Of course that impacts greatly  
3 on the resource question.

4 DR. GOLDBERG: Yes.

5 MR. GRABOSKE: This is to be a non-redaction  
6 review. It's up or down -- you're going to look at it.  
7 A document's going to be up or down; a series is going  
8 to be up or down -- not (inaudible) shakedown. There's  
9 no time or resources for that.

10 MR. DAVIS: That I think is -- and correct me  
11 if I'm wrong -- but I think that will save greatly on  
12 the amount of time (inaudible) document. I would ask  
13 that whenever a document is pulled, because this has  
14 been a problem, that some sort of adequate description  
15 of the document be placed on a pull card and the pull  
16 card is inserted in the files. And that may appear at  
17 a first glance to be very technical matter, but if  
18 information, for example, the author of the document,  
19 the date of the document, the recipients of the  
20 document, an unclassified subject line -- if  
21 information of that nature isn't on a pull card, you  
22 folks who work in the declassification area often get a  
23 lot of unnecessary FOIAs and NPRs.

24 DR. GOLDBERG: That means you have to ask for  
25 still additional resources.

1 DR. WAMPLER: But NARA does that when they  
2 process these --

3 MR. DAVIS: That's standard procedure.

4 DR. WAMPLER: Yes.

5 DR. GOLDBERG: Alright.

6 DR. WAMPLER: Well, sometimes there's  
7 information, for example, on the contents of the  
8 document on the pull card, and sometimes there's not.

9 MR. DAVIS: Well sometimes they classify the  
10 title.

11 DR. WAMPLER: Pardon?

12 MR. DAVIS: Sometimes they classify the  
13 title.

14 DR. WAMPLER: Well, sometimes it's a  
15 classified subject in these documents, but oftentimes --  
16 -- even though it's a TRSD (ph) document, it's an  
17 unclassified subject.

18 MR. S. GOLDBERG: Sometimes it's not.

19 MR. DAVIS: Sometimes it's not, but when it's  
20 not, all I'm asking is that -- as an example that  
21 unclassified subject line be placed on the pull card.  
22 So the people in subsequent years can make an informed  
23 decision on whether they're going to include it in the  
24 FOIA or the NPR.

25 MS. SCHAUBLE: It's mostly the documents we

1 get are not portion marked, we can't always tell how  
2 much information we can put on these withdrawal cards  
3 without going over into unclassified areas.

4 MR. DAVIS: Well, at a minimum we could ask  
5 that if there's an unclassified subject line on the  
6 document that please place it on the pull card.

7 PROF. MAY: We could endorse that. We would  
8 also endorse the principle of the specific basis for  
9 the exemption being there -- not the general, but it is  
10 one of the exempt categories.

11 DR. GOLDBERG: Which of the specific?

12 PROF. MAY: For example, there certainly is  
13 some form of restrictive data that low classification  
14 that (inaudible) by; but there is on the other hand,  
15 top secret restrictive data that is known to every  
16 physicist in the world.

17 DR. GOLDBERG: Such as how to make a bomb.

18 PROF. MAY: There's a lot of stuff and if we  
19 know that, then it's possible -- you're not going to  
20 know that or probably the people who are making the  
21 choices and block the matter out, but there might be  
22 some way in which the laboratory or other committee  
23 that reviews this stuff -- I don't know which things  
24 they ought to look at -- label that this is exempted --  
25 exempted under the nuclear weapons provision.

1 DR. GOLDBERG: Well, this is the kind of  
2 subject that we should deal with when we have  
3 representatives of the agencies and offices up here to  
4 talk with us. With reference to our report, I think  
5 we've got a pretty fair idea of what we're going to  
6 include in it and what we should not include. I  
7 suggest that the probably procedure ought to be to  
8 draft such a report and send it out to members of the  
9 panel for their review and comment. On the basis of  
10 that, prepare a final report of which you'll also  
11 receive a copy and submit that to Secretary Page.

12 I think we have a long way to go here before  
13 we can make more specific suggestions that I think have  
14 been agreed on for inclusion in this report -- this  
15 first report. This is a first report. It seems to me  
16 that it ought to be in general terms. I think we have  
17 highlighted the specific instances or specific items  
18 that we think ought to be included in it, namely the  
19 need for more resources to see to it that something  
20 effective comes out of all this; the desire of the  
21 panel for more information to be gotten initially  
22 directly from representatives of the services and some  
23 of the agencies appearing here at our next meeting  
24 perhaps and giving us this kind of information; the --  
25 where we'd like to see the emphasis placed, the

1 particular offices which we've already mentioned  
2 several times that ought to have priority.

3 I think that would probably be sufficient for  
4 our first -- that in the future we would like to go  
5 beyond this; take some additional steps; to specify  
6 areas that we think ought to be given priority for  
7 declassification. And beyond that, perhaps specify  
8 particular files, series, that ought to be given  
9 priority if we -- if and how we can determine it from  
10 the declassification plans.

11 Now, what more would you like to see included  
12 in this report? Sounds good. If that satisfies you,  
13 if you think that's enough for an initial step, then  
14 that's how we will proceed. We'll draft a report, see  
15 that you get a copy of it. Make your comments into  
16 consideration and send out the final. We will -- I'll  
17 try to homogenize it to everybody's satisfaction --  
18 possibility, of course, but I will try, and I hope that  
19 you will give me your best thoughts on the subject.  
20 Language can sometimes be important in a report of this  
21 kind and you can help improve both language and the  
22 thought, it would be very much appreciated.

23 Is there anything else anyone would like to  
24 bring up?

25 MR. BROWN: (inaudible) member of the panel

1 in the meeting here to come over to the Navy Yard and  
2 sit down and talk to us, give you some insight to the  
3 Navy declassification plan. Sit down and talk with us  
4 about elements of the plan.

5 DR. GOLDBERG: Yes, I think something we can  
6 do for the panel members is probably give you a list of  
7 the people in the services and the other agencies who  
8 are concerned, who are responsible for the  
9 declassification security. That might help if you want  
10 to make any further connections with them. I think we  
11 can do that, can't we? Yes. Alright, if there's  
12 nothing else, we stand adjourned. Thank you.


13 (Whereupon, at 3:00 p.m. the meeting in the  
14 above captioned matter was concluded.)

1  
2 REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE

3 This is to certify that the attached  
4 proceedings before: DEPT. OF DEFENSE  
5

6  
7 In the Matter of: ADVISORY PANEL  
8 DOD HISTORICAL RECORDS  
9 DECLASSIFICATION  
10

11  
12 were held as herein appears and that this is the  
13 original transcript thereof for the file of the  
14 Department, Commission, Administrative Law Judge  
15 or the Agency.  
16

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18   
19 Official Reporter.

20 Dated: FEBRUARY 23, 1996  
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